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What Happens in orth Minneapolis Doesn’t Stay in orth Minneapolis:
Arguing Credibility in a Criminal Trial, Rebutting Implicit Jury Bias, and Taking a &ew Look at Why a Prosecutor
Would Tell Jurors that Civilian Witnesses are from a “Different World”
By: Joshua Larson
This is north Minneapolis. In the juror questionnaires you were
asked - all of you were asked, “Is there a place in Minneapolis
where you would prefer not to go?” and most, if not all of you,
said north Minneapolis. Well, this is north Minneapolis, folks.
This case is north Minneapolis.1
It may be a different lifestyle and different world, but it's a world
where many of the witnesses in this case reside. It's their reality. .
..
The witnesses who saw Steven &ix get murdered . . . deserve the
same consideration as any other person, the same standards, the
same rules, the same consideration. They [may] look different,
they may perhaps sound different. Their lifestyles may be perhaps
different, it doesn't matter.
For a moment they stepped out of their world where justice is dispensed on the street and came into this courtroom and they put
their trust and they put their faith in this system because it was the
right thing to do . . . .2
Introduction
In several recent homicide cases from Minneapolis,
Minnesota, prosecutors have used a particular rhetorical device in
closing argument that suggests to jurors that certain civilian witnesses from North Minneapolis4 live in a different world than the
jurors do and that, therefore, the jurors must consider the witnesses’
unique cultural characteristics when weighing the witnesses’ credibility.5 Defense attorneys have decried these “different world”
arguments.6 The Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed concern
that such arguments could violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial
by insinuating that the defendant is from a different world and by
introducing unnecessary racial or socioeconomic considerations.7
The court expresses genuine due process concerns; however, its
reaction to these arguments reveals a surprising and cumbersome
reluctance to recognize that jurors apply racial and socioeconomic
stereotypes without prompting.8 The court also fails to appreciate
that prosecutors are trying to curb, rather than to invoke, this sort of
prejudicial thinking.9 When a prosecutor knows or reasonably suspects that jurors harbor prejudices about witnesses from particular
neighborhoods within a jurisdiction, it seems reasonable for the
prosecutor to address and discourage those prejudices so that jurors
can properly weigh the credibility of the witnesses based on the evidence and courtroom testimony.10 Certainly, the highest goal is to
eliminate prejudice in the courtroom. However, to achieve this goal
by persuading jurors to move past their prejudices, a prosecutor
may have to alert jurors of these prejudices.
This article suggests that the “different world” argument
seeks to eliminate jury bias and prejudice. The “different world”
argument may be a reasonable and fair way to emphasize the credibility of civilian witnesses when prosecutors speak to a jury of citizens from a community of diverse socioeconomics and human
experience.The key for the prosecutor is to appreciate the potential
dangers of making a “different world” argument. The key for the
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court is to understand and respect the purpose of such an argument
so that it can provide proper constraints and clear instruction to
attorneys to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
This article argues that a prosecutor should be permitted,
during closing argument, to acknowledge the cultural and socioeconomic distinctions that exist between witnesses testifying at a
trial and the jury members of the same trial, for the limited purpose
of arguing that, despite those differences, the witnesses are credible.
However, the prosecutor must refer to evidence in the record and
avoid making insinuations about the defendant’s character.
This article is divided into six sections. Part II looks at the roles of
the prosecutor, witnesses, and jurors in a criminal trial.11 Part III
provides background information about North Minneapolis and
Hennepin County, Minnesota to illustrate the real and perceived
chasms between North Minneapolis residents and the other residents of the county where North Minneapolis is located.12 Part IV
discusses four recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases, each of
which addresses a “different world” argument made by a Hennepin
County prosecutor to describe civilian witnesses from North
Minneapolis.13 Part V analyzes the structure of these “different
world” arguments. It also reviews the court’s treatment of these
arguments in the context of prosecutorial error, several cases in
which the prosecutor erred by improperly aligning himself or herself with jurors to the detriment of the criminal defendant, and the
realities of implicit juror bias.14 Part VI suggests what the court
should consider when determining the propriety of a particular “different world” argument.15 Specifically, the court should be concerned with whether the prosecutor is referring to evidence in the
record and whether the prosecutor is making negative insinuations
about the defendant’s character.16
The Roles of The Prosecutor, Witnesses, and Jurors

Once a jury is selected and a criminal trial is underway, a
prosecutor’s task is to introduce evidence – almost exclusively
through testimony – that enables jurors to reach the same conclusion that the prosecutor has reached: that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.17 Except for serving this maître d'
function, the prosecutor’s role in the outcome of the trial is limited.18 While the prosecutor certainly shares in the responsibility of
ensuring a fair trial, the prosecutor stands somewhat on the periphery of the jury’s attention. The trial itself is a conversation between
the witnesses and the jurors,19 and the jurors are the sole judges of
credibility.20 Generally, the state’s case succeeds only if the jurors
believe the state’s witnesses to the approximate degree that the
prosecutor believes them.21 Because the prosecutor is prohibited
from vouching for the witnesses or the sufficiency of the evidence,22 the prosecutor relies on the state’s witnesses to appear
believable and to provide the requisite evidence.23 By relying on
witnesses, especially civilian witnesses, the prosecutor faces many
challenges, including finding ways to combat the various methods
defense attorneys use to attack witnesses’ credibility.24 In this context, it is crucial for a prosecutor to utilize her closing argument to
address concerns that jurors may have about the credibility of the
state’s witnesses. The prosecutor must also insulate witnesses from
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potential juror prejudice and bias, especially when the prosecutor
can anticipate that a witness’ lack of credibility will be a theme in
the defense attorney’s closing argument. There certainly are impermissible ways to discuss the credibility of witnesses. However,
these prohibitions should not prevent the prosecutor from vigorously arguing that the state’s witnesses are worthy of the jury’s trust.28
In a usual case, a prosecutor is likely to have high confidence in and familiarity with her witnesses and the witnesses will
have credentials that support credibility, such as a high-ranking
police officer. Most of the state’s witnesses are likely to be government employees, e.g. police officers, medical and lab staff, and
medical examiners, and, consequently, the state will have a great
deal of confidence in its witnesses and control over who they will
be.29 Also, the prosecutor is aided by the fact that state-employed
witnesses are typically motivated to testify because testifying is
often viewed as part of their employment responsibilities, if not
their calling, as civil servants.30
In contrast, civilian witnesses such as eyewitnesses to a
crime originate from a different selection process – better known as
“fate” – and may have very disparate levels of motivation.
Compared to the government’s employment process, there is no
selection process for civilian witnesses; there is no voir dire or call
to a central casting agency when a crime occurs.32 A witness might
unexpectedly encounter a drive-by shooting, or could be involved
with a victim or a defendant in a myriad of additional relevant
ways.33 Consequently, as a case develops, a prosecutor may gain
some unexpected bedfellows, and “doing justice” in a particular
case may come down to whether a jury believes an unvetted
stranger whose character, acumen, and level of commitment to the
prosecution are uncontrolled variables.34
The most challenging witness variables faced by the prosecution are likely to be prior felony convictions, prior inconsistent
statements, an unwillingness to speak to police, little-to-no motivation to testify, and plea bargains that require witnesses to testify.35
The defense often is confronted with challenges related to the limited language and articulation skills of the defendant during a trial,
but even a government witness who speaks in nonstandard English
or who mumbles may become a liability for the state.36 One might
call these issues “baggage,” but at trial, these credibility indicators
are potential flaws in the state’s case that defense attorneys can
exploit to discredit the state’s witnesses in the eyes of the jury, and
to distract the jury from the defendant’s alleged misdeeds.37
Consequently, success in a strongly-contested trial typically boils
down to the credibility of the witnesses, and that means that the
prosecutor’s case will depend on what factors jurors use to weigh
credibility.28
Any reasonable attorney would be concerned that the factors used by the jurors are fair and reflect the instructions provided
by the court,39 and any reasonable attorney would want to present
a witness’ “baggage” in as decent light as possible by reminding
jurors that the witness’ life may be far different from the jurors’
lives.40 In recent years, some prosecutors in Hennepin County,
when arguing about witness credibility, have chosen to refer to a
“different world” that witnesses in North Minneapolis inhabit.41
Defense attorneys and the court have raised questions about the propriety of such references and of their potential impact on the jury.
To understand the perspectives of the parties, an appropriate preliminary question is: “What is special or peculiar about North
Minneapolis such that it receives special attention and treatment?”
"orth Minneapolis and Hennepin County:
Demographics and Homicide Statistics
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The geographical boundaries of North Minneapolis can be
defined in several ways: by its thirteen “neighborhoods,”42 its two
“communities,” or the boundaries of the Fourth Police Precinct.44
By whatever measure, North Minneapolis is a region of
Minneapolis that sits west and northwest of Downtown
Minneapolis;45 it comprises about one-fifth of the city’s 58.7
square mile land area and is roughly bounded by Interstate 94W on
the east, Interstate 394 on the south, and the city limits on the west
and north.46
In 2000, Minneapolis had a population of 382,618 people.47 Its racial composition was 249,618 (65%) white residents,
68,818 (18%) African-American residents, 29,175 (8%) Hispanic
residents, 23,744 (6%) Asian residents, and 8,378 (2%) Native
American residents.48 Figures from 2006 suggest that these figures
have been stable generally.49 North Minneapolis contains 17.5% of
the city’s population50 and a large percentage and high density of
the city’s African-Americans.51 North Minneapolis’s two communities, Camden and Near North, are among the city’s poorest five
communities, “which have the city’s lowest property values, highest percentage of homes in substandard condition, . . . the most
crime[, and e]ighty percent of all African American children . . . .”52
Only 28% of African-American men enrolled in Minneapolis Public
Schools graduate in four years.53 As might be predicted with these
demographics, the per capita income of residents of North
Minneapolis averages roughly half the per capita income of the city
as a whole,54 and the percentage of children eligible for free school
lunch (an indicator of poverty) is much higher in North Minneapolis
than in other regions of the city.55 In fact, 30-50% of residents living in many neighborhoods in North Minneapolis live in poverty. 56
Despite the fact that North Minneapolis comprises only
one-fifth of the geographical size of Minneapolis and 17.5% of the
city’s population,57 it accounts for roughly half of the city’s homicides.58 Since 1982, the number of homicides in Minneapolis per
year has fluctuated from eighteen in 1983 to ninety-seven in 1995.59
Of those deaths classified as homicides, North Minneapolis
accounted for twenty-nine (54%) of the fifty-four homicides in
2004, twenty-one (42%) of the fourty-nine homicides in 2005, and
twenty-nine (48%) of the sixty homicides in 2006.60 In 2007,
despite double-digit decreases in violent crime in North
Minneapolis, it still accounted for twenty-seven (57%) of the city's
forty-seven homicides.61 Data also shows that most murders in
Minneapolis involve African-American assailants and AfricanAmerican victims,62 and it is not uncommon for media reports to
introduce the racial backgrounds of assailants and victims when discussing crime in North Minneapolis.63
A commonly-expressed sentiment in the Minnesota media
is that North Minneapolis is a dangerous place where youth and
gang violence runs wild and is the source of most of the violence in
the city.64 Even news articles that otherwise intend to report positive trends in North Minneapolis assume that its readers negatively
associate the region with crime, citizen complacency, and economic blight.65 In major national newspapers such as The New York
Times, North Minneapolis has been compared to notorious communities such as South Los Angeles and Dorchester, Massachusetts as
“[astounding] pockets of crime in this country.”66
Minneapolis is located in Hennepin County along with
forty-five other suburban communities.67 Hennepin County comprises the Fourth Judicial District.68 All state felony cases are handled by the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office69 and jurors taken
from general jury pools are comprised of Hennepin County residents.70 Hennepin County is very large; its area spans over 600
43
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square miles.71 According to the 2000 census, there were 1,116,200
people in the county; the racial makeup of the county was 81%
white, 10% African American, 5% Asian, 4% Hispanic, and 1%
Native American, with the rest consisting of other or multiple
races.72
These demographics have predictable consequences in
terms of socioeconomic status, racial make-up, and exposure to
crime, of the Hennepin County residents who are not from
Minneapolis. The median income for these households in 2000 was
$51,711, over thirty-six percent more than the median income for a
household in Minneapolis and certainly far more than the same figure for a North Minneapolis household.73 Whereas the percentage
of people living in poverty in Minneapolis is 16.9% and the number
of people in many North Minneapolis neighborhoods living in
poverty is 30-50%, only 3.9% of Hennepin County residents living
outside of Minneapolis are living in poverty.74 Of the 99,943
African-Americans in Hennepin County, only 31,125 (30%) live in
areas outside of Minneapolis,75 and African-Americans comprise
only 5% of the population of Hennepin County cities other than
Minneapolis.76 Hennepin County’s lack of diversity outside of
Minneapolis is made clearer by 2000 U.S. Census figures that
reveal that over 60% of all children in Minneapolis are children of
color whereas less than 20% of all children in Hennepin County
outside of Minneapolis are children of color.77 As for homicides,
according to one figure, Minneapolis accounted for over 83% of the
total number of yearly homicides in Hennepin County.78
The “Different World” of "orth Minneapolis

Hennepin County prosecutors have the task of prosecuting
defendants from North Minneapolis who are charged with murder.
These trials obviously take place in a historical and social context
in which Hennepin County residents are aware of the negative reputation of North Minneapolis.79 There have been a number of cases
in recent years in which a prosecutor has faced the prospect of relying on the credibility of civilian witnesses from North Minneapolis.
By taking a look at the facts of these cases in the context of the
above demographic information, it becomes clearer why these prosecutors resorted to “different world” arguments during their closing
arguments.
State v. Ray
i. Facts
On June 13, 1998, around 4:30 PM, Chauncey Teasley was
shot to death near the Parkview Apartments complex, a high-rise at
1201 12th Avenue North in North Minneapolis.80 Police later
found seven shell cases, all fired from the same weapon, one live
bullet several yards from Teasley’s body,81 and a cell phone that
was owned by Secundus Ray.82 Police never found the murder
weapon.83
No more than 1.5 to three minutes before the shooting,
Teasley was standing outside of the Parkview Apartment with his
friend Depring Jackson and Jackson’s sister.84 Jackson lived in the
building, and Teasley went there to visit her with his cousin Howard
Nelson, his cousin “Nobby” Teasley, and Nelson’s infant daughter.85
While Teasley and Jackson talked, a red Ford Taurus
entered the building’s parking lot. A security guard at the building,
Mitchell Hicks, recognized the vehicle because the two individuals
in the vehicle were friends of Jackson and had been at the building
before.86 The two individuals were later identified as Secundus Ray
and Coley Gates.87 When they arrived, Gates and Ray got out of the
Taurus and began to fight with Teasley.88 Gates said to Teasley,
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“You remember me; you shot at me back in the day.”89
According to Jackson, Teasley's “eyes got big and he ran.”90
Before he ran, Teasley told his cousins, “I think they're about to get
me” and “[t]hat's the dude CK [Gates] I got into it with.”91
Teasley then ran down the sidewalk to a wooded area south
of the apartment.92 Jackson told Teasley's cousins, “just get him
and take him home.”93 Teasley’s cousins took off in their car in
search of Teasley. Gates and Ray closely followed them in their
car.94 A few moments later, Gates and Ray turned right, toward the
Meanwhile,
wooded area, and the cousins drove straight.95
Jackson and her sister began pursuing Teasley on foot, saw him running into a field south of the building, and then heard a series of
gunshots.96 Jackson and her sister ran toward the shots, as did the
security guard, Hicks.97 The three of them eventually reached
Teasley, who was lying on the ground, fatally shot.98 Despite the
fact that the murder occurred in broad daylight at 4:30 in the afternoon, no witness claimed to have seen the actual shooting.99
The police investigation into the murder was complicated
by conflicting identifications and witnesses’ accounts.100 For example, Ms. Jackson initially told police and the grand jury that she did
not know the individuals in the Taurus and that she was not at the
crime scene.101 Only after being confronted with video evidence
that indicated that she was present, did she admit that the individuals were Gates and Ray.102 Ms. Jackson rationalized her lack of
candor by stating, “Sergeant Violette, you don't understand, you're
white. You don't live in this neighborhood. You don't have to see
these people after you've talked to them. And I do.”103
Additionally, Jackson’s sister did not initially identify Ray,
though she later picked him out of a photo lineup.104 The security
guard, Hicks, could not identify either Gates or Ray in lineup photos,105 though he claimed that he had recognized the individuals
who were in the Taurus.106 Two nearby residents claimed that they
saw a man running from the scene of the shooting, but their descriptions of the man’s clothing and his height were inconsistent and
changed over time.107 Also, individuals who claimed to have heard
gunshots had inconsistent accounts about the number of shots
fired.108
Ray was indicted by a grand jury for first-degree murder
on October 27, 1998.109 He later was arrested in Chicago.110
During a police interview in Chicago on November 9, 1998, Ray
initially denied being present at the apartment building but later
admitted being present, though he denied any involvement in the
shooting.111 He was subsequently tried and convicted of first degree
murder.112
ii. The Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
During his closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the
inconsistent statements made by witnesses, particularly Depring
Jackson, and the fact that some witnesses did not come forward initially to explain what they knew about the murder of Teasley.113 The
prosecutor invited the jury to put the evidence “in context, particularly the type of people that presented this evidence . . . .”114 The
prosecutor argued that the lack of immediate candor by witnesses
was due either to the greater amount of violence present in areas of
North Minneapolis or an understandable fear of the reprisal that
witnesses anticipated if they would have come forward and cooperated with the police. Noting that the murder occurred “in broad
daylight, on a Saturday afternoon, near a busy high rise in North
Minneapolis,”116 the prosecutor stated:
I would suggest that if this happened in a lot of other
neighborhoods, say in Golden Valley, or Edina, or
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Minnetonka . . . the reaction of the citizenry . . . would be
a whole lot different from the reaction of the people in
NorthMinneapolis. Their reaction basically takes one of
two forms. One form, they don't want to be involved.
Why? For one of two reasons, either they don't care,
they're apathetic or they fear reprisals. I would suggest
that if this happened in a neighborhood in Edina, people .
. . couldn't get to the phone fast enough to tell the police
what they saw . . . to insure [sic] that this kind of conduct
would never happen in their neighborhood ever again.
But this is a different environment . . . and it's a challenge
for you, because it's not in an environment that most, if
not all of you people, are familiar with.
This is not a dispute between a businessman or a businesswoman from Edina and another businessman or busi
nesswoman from Minnetonka. This is a dispute . . .
involving three young black males in the hood in North
Minneapolis. This is not your environment, this is the
Defendant's environment. So it's a challenge to you to
remove yourself from your environment and look at this
case and these witnesses in the context of the environ
ment that they come from.117
The prosecutor continued by stating:
The challenge here is for you not to judge the witnesses
because they are the product of the same environment
that they share with the Defendant. The challenge here is
for you to judge their testimony in spite of the fact that
they come from this environment. It's real easy, you see,
folks, to dismiss people just because they're different
from us, because they come from a different walk of life.
It's really easy to say, well, that will never happen in my
neighborhood so why should I care? ... This system is
designed to do justice and that's what we are asking you
to do, to do justice.118
The prosecutor also sought to bolster the credibility of Howard
Nelson, the victim’s cousin, by acknowledging that Nelson had a
criminal background but arguing that the jury should not dismiss his
testimony based solely on his prior convictions.119 The prosecutor
argued:
Really, other than that, nothing Howard Nelson said was
really particularly damaging to this defendant. He doesn't identify him. He doesn't positively say this person
right here was the person who was with Colie Gates, so
what relevance is it that it was brought out that he has a
criminal background?
The defense brings that out because they want you to dismiss him. The more you despise someone, the easier it is
to dismiss them. But would that be fair and just in this
case? It's up you to decide this, folks, but you need to ask
yourselves that what relevance is there to the testimony
that Howard Nelson presented that he has a criminal back
ground, and what a surprise when you think about this
environment, when you think about where this crime took
place. What a surprise that somebody has got some criminal conviction.120
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal
Among the claims made on appeal, the defendant argued
that the prosecutor erred during closing argument by suggesting that
“the jury should judge [the defendant] and many of the witnesses
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differently because they came from a different environment.”121
The defendant contended that this argument made “the implicit suggestion that it was appropriate to apply racial considerations to Ray
and to the crime.”122 The defendant also claimed that the prosecutor's closing argument was “an attempt to supply a ‘race-based’
explanation for the states' witnesses and to imply that racial considerations were appropriate in considering [his] fate.”123 The court
addressed the defendant’s misconduct claim in spite of the fact that
it had already decided to reverse on other grounds, “to provide guidance to the district court should the state engage in similar conduct
in the new trial.”124
The court acknowledged that “‘the propriety of a prosecutor’s final argument is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court’”125 and noted that defense counsel did not object to the
state’s closing argument.126 However, the court found the prosecutor’s comments very problematic:
In cases where race should be irrelevant, racial . . . considerations, in particular, can affect a juror's impartiality
and must be removed from courtroom proceedings to the
fullest extent possible . . . . Above all, demeaning references to racial groups compromise the right to a fair trial
by inviting jurors to view a defendant as coming from a
different community than themselves. Here, the prosecutor invited the jurors to view the entire occurrence as
involving three young black males in the hood in North
Minneapolis, a world wholly outside their own. Such an
invitation asks the jury to apply racial and socio-economic considerations that would deny a defendant a fair trial.
Such an invitation must be avoided in the new trial.127
The court focused on the particular phrases of the prosecutor’s argument that identified the defendant and witnesses as black men from
North Minneapolis, but, surprisingly, the court did not address how
the prosecutor’s insistence that the jurors should not judge the witnesses based on their environment affected the jurors.128
State v. Clifton
i. Facts
On September 23, 2002, at around 7:00 p.m., Steven Nix
was “hanging out,” smoking marijuana, and drinking alcohol with
his friends Darryl Neal and Calvin Combs in Neal’s SUV on a residential street in the Tangletown neighborhood in North
Minneapolis.129 Seemingly out of nowhere, Brian Clifton walked
up to the GMC Jimmy and shot Nix in the head from two or three
feet away.130 Clifton tried to shoot again, but the gun jammed.131
Neal immediately drove Nix to North Memorial Hospital, but the
bullet had fatally lacerated Nix’s brain.132 Just before the shooting,
Clifton’s cousin Claudell Walker was in the area, and he witnessed
Clifton walk up to the SUV and shoot Nix in the head.133
Neal later identified Clifton from a photo display, stating
“[t]hat’s him, that’s your shooter.”134 With Neal’s assistance, police
eventually were able to locate Walker and Combs, both of whom
identified Clifton as the shooter.135
Through their investigation, police learned that Nix and
Clifton had a dramatic history with each other.136 In February 2002,
Nix was charged with the attempted murder of Clifton’s brother at
a party in North Minneapolis.137 Following a June 2002 jury trial,
Nix was acquitted.138 On the day the jury returned the verdict in
Nix’s trial:
Clifton and his family met with the Nix trial prosecutor
and victim advocate outside the courtroom. Clifton was
very angry. As the prosecutor explained that the criminal
case was over, Clifton made some comments, the gist of
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which was that “this could be taken care of some other
way.” Clifton was also overheard swearing that he was
“going to kill” or “get” Nix.139
Police also learned that, throughout the summer of 2002, when
Clifton crossed paths with Nix in their North Minneapolis neighborhood, Clifton made “threatening gestures towards Nix.”140
On the strength of this evidence, Clifton was indicted,
tried, and ultimately convicted of first-degree premeditated murder.141
ii. Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
In her closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that
there could be differences in background and lifestyle between the
jurors, the victim, and the state’s witnesses, but argued that all of the
witnesses deserve the jurors’ equal respect:
In preparing these remarks I thought about you as jurors
and how different your lives may be from the lives and
the lifestyles of many of the people who testified before
you and from the victim, Steven Nix.
And how could you transport yourself to the world of the
streets in Tangletown, a world where people gather on the
neighborhood block and hang out. They look for action.
They recognize people by sight, know them only by nick
name, [do] a little drinking, find some marijuana, smoke
a little marijuana, see who is partying, see who's hanging.
I'm not saying that that's the life of everybody in that
area, of course. But there are some folks who do go
there and hang out.
It's a world, at least to some extent, where some people
don't trust the system and don't call the police when they
see somebody with a gun. They don't run from trouble
but almost seem to flirt with it or at least co-exist with it.
. . .It may be a different lifestyle and different world, but
it's a world where many of the witnesses in this case
reside. It's their reality . . . .142
Our laws, ladies and gentlemen, are not different for different people. They're uniform. It doesn't matter who you
are, it doesn't matter your lifestyle, it doesn't matter your
race, your gender, your sexual orientation. That doesn't
matter. All of us are entitled to the full protection of the
law. It doesn't matter what kind of a life you led either.
No matter how he led his life, Steven Nix's murder
deserves to be investigated and his murder deserves to be
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. The witnesses
who saw Steven Nix get murdered and came into the
courtroom to tell you what they saw and what they heard,
they deserve the same consideration as any other person,
the same standards, the same rules, the same consideration. They may look different, they may perhaps sound
different. Their lifestyles may be perhaps different, it
doesn't matter.143
For a moment they stepped out of their world where justice is dispensed on the street and came into this courtroom
and they put their trust and they put their faith in this system because it was the right thing to do . . . .144
There were three eyewitnesses who saw the defendant
kill Mr. Nix, Darryl Neal, nicknamed Dee Dee or Little
One; Mr. Combs, Calvin, Mr. Walker, Cheese. These are
people who live and work and hang ‘out in that particular
area. They are the witnesses who were there that night.
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They are the witnesses who saw what happened.145
You know, it would be nice when you're preparing a case
for trial, if you were able to call up a movie studio and
call up central casting and say, “Say, I need a couple of
witnesses for my trial and could there be a nun and could
there be a firefighter and maybe a minister? Could you
throw in some people that would be just so believable by
who they are?” But that's not reality.
The reality is you have to go to the people who are there
at the time, who saw what they saw. Those are the people
who are your witnesses, the people who were at this incident.
They may have different lifestyles and perhaps some
times different ways of phrasing things and perhaps different reactions to events that some of you may have.146
However, -- and maybe different communication styles
when they're in here as well testifying. But we are all
members of the same community. We live in the same
area, we have the same laws, we have the same courts,
they are a part of us, and we are a part of them.147
So they came to the police in three different ways and
there are three people who stepped out of their world, the
world of perhaps street justice, if you will, and came in
here and decided to participate in the system. Three people who showed by their actions in this case that they
want the violence to stop.148
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal
After he was convicted, one of Clifton’s claims on appeal
was that the prosecutor’s above-quoted remarks constituted prosecutorial error.149 Clifton alleged that the state “improperly incited
jurors to view [Clifton] as coming from a different community than
they did and to insert racial and socio-economic differences into a
case where such considerations were irrelevant.”150 Clifton argued
that that the state’s closing argument involved setting up an “our
versus “their” community mentality for the purposes of inciting
jurors to view Clifton as coming from a different community.151
The court reviewed the prosecutor’s closing argument and
held that the above-quoted remarks were improper in at least three
respects. “First, the remarks bordered on injecting issues broader
than the guilt or innocence of the accused. Second, the remarks
came close to appealing to passion and prejudice. Third and more
importantly, these remarks were demeaning.” The Court repeated
the mantra found in Ray: “‘Above all, demeaning references to
racial groups compromise the right to a fair trial by inviting the
jurors to review a defendant as coming from a different community
than themselves.’”153 The court also pointed to the prosecutor’s failure to heed the Ray holding:
Our decision in Ray was filed on April 17, 2003. Trial in
the instant case commenced on September 8, 2003. The
record reflects that the parties were aware of the Ray
decision and, in fact, the court made evidentiary rulings
in line with Ray. So it is with some dismay that we are
looking at the same kind of closing argument out of the
same county attorney's office, but one in which defense
counsel acquiesced.154
The court explained that it did not matter that the closing argument
was not “calculated to cause the jury to decide the case on the basis
of passion or prejudice rather than reason.”155 “Where race is irrelevant, ‘racial considerations, in particular, can affect a juror’s
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impartiality and must be removed from courtroom proceedings to
the fullest extent possible.’”156 Despite its obvious disapproval, the
court decided that the interests of justice did not demand a new trial
“where unlike Ray, there was no explicit reference to race or use of
race to disparage the defendant, the argument had a basis in the
record, and Clifton otherwise received a fair trial . . . .”157 Here the
court did not discuss what conclusions the jurors could have made
on their own based on the trial evidence in the absence of the prosecutor’s remarks, and did not consider the prosecutor’s statements
within the context of the prosecutor’s request that jurors provide the
witnesses equal consideration and consider them a part of the
jurors’ community.158
State v. Paul
i.Facts
Late in the morning on November 7, 2002, Fred
Williamson was shot and killed as he was riding with two friends,
Bryan Herron and Antonio Wilson, in Herron’s car after eating
breakfast at a North Minneapolis café.159 According to Herron and
Wilson, a black truck pulled up on the passenger side of the car and
the driver of the truck fired shots into the car, one of which hit
Williamson below the right armpit, eventually killing him.160
Herron and Wilson later testified that they thought the black truck
was the same vehicle they had seen Leroy Paul in as he exited the
café, and Wilson testified that, although he did not see who the
shooter was, he was a “hundred percent” certain that Paul was the
shooter.161
Williamson, Herron, and Wilson encountered Paul and his
girlfriend Kesha Dent at the café just as they were leaving and Paul
was arriving in a black SUV owned by his friend Kenneth
Spencer.162 Paul, Williamson, and Herron had been friends for
years, but Paul and Williamson recently had a “falling out.”163
At the café, Williamson approached Paul, and they got into a confrontation in which Paul “drew a .40 caliber gun out of the waistband of his pants, put a bullet in the chamber, and then put the gun
at his side, but did not point it at anyone.”164 Wilson later claimed
that he did not see Paul with a gun during this confrontation, and
Dent stated that, instead of witnessing the confrontation, she walked
into the café and ordered food for herself and Paul.165 After the confrontation, Williamson left with Herron and Wilson, and
Williamson soon retrieved a nine millimeter gun from under the
front seat and loaded it.166 Herron and Wilson took the gun away
from Williamson and unloaded it.167 Williamson was later shot.168
Herron brought Williamson to the hospital after he was
shot, dropped him off at the emergency room, and fled the scene.169
Police obtained a description of Herron from hospital staff, pursued
him, and later found him walking in traffic a block away from the
hospital.170 When speaking to police, Herron acknowledged being
with Williamson, but failed to mention that Wilson was there as
well. He also claimed he could not recall the name of the café, but
described the shooter’s vehicle as being “gray” and “possibly a
van,” and stated that he had “no information on the shooter.”171 In
short, the victim’s friend lied to the police about facts police could
have used to solve the case.
Police gathered forensic evidence that confirmed that
Williamson was shot with .40 caliber ammunition while riding in
Herron’s car.172 Police visited Williamson’s family and parole and
probation officers, but they could not locate cooperative witnesses.173 After a year of investigating the shooting, in November 2003,
a new investigator was assigned to the case.174 In January 2004, the
investigator re-interviewed Herron, who was being held in federal
custody in connection with drug and firearm charges.175 Eventually,
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Herron made a plea arrangement on the federal charges that
required him to provide “substantial assistance” to the Williamson
murder investigation.176 The investigator gained new information
from interviews with Herron, Dent, Wilson, and Spencer in
February 2004, and he was able to interview Paul in March 2004.177
During this interview, Paul denied shooting Williamson,
denied knowing Williamson well, denied knowing
Williamson's nickname, denied ever going to the café
with Dent, denied ever riding in Spencer's truck with
Dent, identified certain photographs of people related to
the investigation, and indicated that he was unable to
definitively identify people in other photographs-including Williamson.178
On March 17, 2004, the state charged Paul with Williamson's murder, and Paul was indicted on charges of first-degree premeditated
murder and first-degree felony murder while committing a drive-by
shooting.179 At Paul’s trial, which began on January 18, 2005, the
State’s witnesses provided complicated and often-contradicted testimony about their whereabouts on the morning of the murder.180
As the Minnesota Supreme Court summarized:
Dent testified that while they were outside the café, Paul
asked her to go inside to order their food, and then he
left, saying that he would be “right back.” Dent testified
that Paul did not return, and Spencer picked her up at the
café. But Spencer indicated on cross examination that he
did not pick up Dent at the café that day. Dent further
testified that she met Paul at a home in north
Minneapolis, and Dent and Paul then drove in Dent's car
to their Apple Valley apartment. Dent testified that Paul
told her that day “that Fred had shot at him, and he had
shot back at him, and it was self-defense.” She also testified that Paul told her to tell the police “that [Paul] was
with me. He didn't leave out of my eyesight.” Spencer
testified that when he saw Paul around 12:15 p.m. on
November 7, Paul told him that “he thought he killed
Fred.” Spencer testified that he “started tripping out”
upon hearing this statement and asked Paul what he had
done to Williamson. Paul then responded that he had not
done anything. 181
Despite the contradictions of the witnesses and their lack of cooperation, the jury found Paul guilty of first-degree felony murder and
second-degree murder.182
ii. The Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
The prosecutor began her closing argument with the following comments:
This is my opportunity to welcome you to the real world.
What you've seen in the last few days is a world where
an argument is sometimes settled with a gun. A world
where a young man gets killed in broad daylight while
he's sitting in a car. A world where his friends and other
acquaintances won't tell the authorities what really happened until more than a year later. A world where a fam
ily has to wait for over a year to find out that something's
going to happen about their son's death. Now during jury
selection, I told you that you might hear about-from people that you don't like; people who's [sic] lifestyles you
don't agree with, aren't familiar with. You've now been
introduced to all of that, haven't you?
It certainly wasn't easy for [Herron] to be here. This is
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part of the real world that I talked about. Part of our
community that doesn't trust the police.
Ladies and gentlemen, in these kind [sic] of cases, a case
where there's [sic] people who have relationships with a
defendant, relationships to a defendant, in this real world
I've described to you, sometimes people don't want to get
involved. And these aren't people who keep journals,
these aren't people who write a diary, they're not people
who may remember absolutely everything, and I don't
mean to be disparaging in saying that, but you realize that
some of these people live in a very different world, and
their memories may not be perfect, but they came in here
and told you what it was that they saw happened.183
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal
The defendant claimed that the above-quoted remarks constituted unobjected-to prosecutorial error, arguing that “the [state]
subtly injected racial issues and distinguished between the jurors'
world and the world of the Defendant, victim, and witnesses”184
and that, by contrasting the jury’s world to “their world,” the state
“impermissibly invited the jury to take into account racial and/or
socio-economic considerations.”185 The court disagreed, concluding that the remarks,
did not rise to the level of misconduct because the
remarks were brief; the jury was not expressly invited to
compare their own ‘world’ with the “real world”
described; the remarks summarized the evidence in the
case; the remarks were not demeaning; there was no
mention of race, culture, neighborhoods, or any particular
community; and the remarks were apparently intended to
address inconsistencies and the lack of cooperation by
witnesses-which were a focus of the defense case-rather
than to appeal to the passions of the jury.186
However, the court reviewed its holdings in Ray and Clifton and
made clear that it did not approve of these types of arguments:
Although we find no error here, we take this opportunity
to remind attorneys and district courts of the concerns we
raised in Clifton and Ray, and encourage attorneys to
refrain from using concepts and terms such as different
“worlds” or “these people” to refer to the people intimately involved in the case. Such imagery may imply
that the people involved with the case are somehow collectively distinguishable from the jurors on an inappropriate basis. If an attorney intends to convey that certain
witnesses are credible despite behaving in a way that a
juror might not understand, we respectfully suggest that
there are other, more appropriate ways to address this
concern. Finally, we reaffirm our “strong commitment to
rooting out bias, no matter how subtle,” and invite all
attorneys participating in the criminal justice system to
join this effort.187
State v. Wren
i.Facts
On the afternoon of March 4, 2005, Frank Haynes and
Raleigh Robinson were shot and killed while having lunch at the
Penn Best Steak House in North Minneapolis.188 The two men were
sitting near Antonio Washington and two other men when James
Wren entered the restaurant with a gun, and while talking wildly on
his cell phone, walked up to the table where Washington was seat-
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ed, shot at Washington three times, and then ran into the kitchen and
out an emergency exit, still carrying the gun.189 Wren’s errant shots
missed Washington and fatally wounded Haynes and Robinson.190
After the shooting, Washington and another man,
Cornelius Branch, followed Wren with a gun.191 Branch fired his
gun several times as they were leaving the restaurant, and then
Washington took the gun and fired two shots at Wren outside of the
restaurant. None of the bullets hit Wren and he ran around the corner of the building and down an alley.192 Wren got to his car and
drove away from the scene. He eventually arrived at a house where
two of his acquaintances, A.J. and Teda Ayler, observed Wren with
the gun and heard him say that he was going to stash it in the basement.193 Ms. Ayler told police that she heard Wren say that he “just
got into it with the niggers who shot [his] brother” and “I need to
get out of here.” She later denied this statement and the state
impeached her for contradicting her prior statement.194
The murder investigation quickly focused on Wren after
police learned that there was considerable tension between
Washington and Wren.195 Specifically, Wren suspected that
Washington had shot his brother in May 2004.196 Also, Cynthia
Harris, who was at the steak house when the shooting took place,
told police that she saw Wren with a gun, though she also later
denied this statement at Wren's trial.197 Police never located the
murder weapon198 but they found Wren’s DNA evidence on cigarette butts found in the car that was seen leaving the crime scene and
later abandoned.199
Police apprehended Wren in Chicago on May 3, 2005,200
and during a police interrogation, Wren admitted that he was present at the restaurant at the time of the shooting but denied that he
was the shooter.201 During his interrogation, Wren was confronted
with the statements of some of the witnesses, and Wren responded
by saying, “[w]ell those witnesses are just going to have to come to
court.”202 Wren was indicted on two counts of murder and one
count of attempted murder.203 The case was tried a year later and
there was significant pretrial publicity. A newspaper article printed
before voir dire began reported that one of the state’s witnesses,
Teda Ayler, was physically assaulted by her own sister in an attempt
to prevent Ayler from testifying at Wren’s trial.204 There was such
negative publicity and fear of retaliatory gang violence surrounding
the case that the court took the rare step to empanel an anonymous
jury.205 When he was finally tried, the jury convicted Wren of all
three offenses.206
ii. The Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
In his closing argument, the prosecutor sought to acknowledge and explain why several of the state’s witnesses seemed reluctant to testify or contradicted their previous statements by reminding the jurors that this incident occurred in North Minneapolis:
This is north Minneapolis. In the juror questionnaires you
were asked - all of you were asked, “Is there a place in
Minneapolis where you would prefer not to go?” and
most, if not all of you, said north Minneapolis. Well, this
is north Minneapolis, folks. This case is north
Minneapolis.207
Some . . . witnesses show you how fearful they can be to
come in here and testify on a murder case that happens in
north Minneapolis. You know, Raleigh Robinson and
Frank Haynes were just having lunch. . . . And so if you
live in that environment and recognize that you can die
just because you're having lunch and you're in the wrong
place at the wrong time, imagine the kinds of feelings
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and emotions a witness might have when they recognize
that they have relevant evidence that could convict some
one who's got a lot of buddies out there some of which
there's evidence were assisting him that day and you have
to go back to that environment.
Some of you who live in places other than north
Minneapolis indicated in that questionnaire that that's not
a place you want to go to especially at night. Well, just
consider what it's like if you live there and you come in
here and testify and then you have to go back there.
Recognize that even randomly you could die and you got
even a better chance of being victimized if you come in
here and testify and implicate someone who's got buddies
out there that can help him.
So what a surprise would it be that you have people like
Teda Ayler and even to some extent Cynthia Harris,
although Cynthia was a little bit more of a jerk than Teda.
But what a surprise is it that you see some of these witnesses come in here reluctantly and demonstrating their
fear and testifying and in a case like this? Does that surprise you? What does your common sense and reason tell
you about that?208
The prosecutor also suggested that Wren was aware of his ability to
intimidate witnesses when he told police that the witnesses against
him would “just . . . have to come to court.” The prosecutor stated
that this statement suggested a “[l]ittle bit of street knowledge of
this guy knowing how difficult it is for witnesses to come to
court.”209
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal
On appeal, Wren alleged that the prosecutor’s references
during closing argument to North Minneapolis constituted misconduct and prejudiced him.210 The court restated its case law in this
area by holding that it is error for a prosecutor to ask jurors to apply
racial and socio-economic considerations but it is not error for a
prosecutor to seek to prepare jurors for evidence of an unfamiliar
world.211 With little elaboration on that distinction, the court determined that the prosecutor’s references to North Minneapolis did not
constitute error because they were brief and were used to explain
inconsistencies in the witnesses’ stories.212 According to the court,
the prosecutor’s argument provided,
context for why witnesses were reluctant to cooperate or
changed stories between police interviews and grand jury
testimony and trial, specifically because they came from
a high-crime neighborhood, which may create reluctant
witnesses. There were no references to the racial or
socio-economic background of the witnesses or Wren,
and the prosecutor did not appear to imply that Wren
should be convicted because he was from this environment.213
The court’s critique of the prosecutor’s closing argument was not
entirely glowing, however. The court held that the prosecutor’s
reminder to the jurors about what they stated in their questionnaires
was “arguably improper” because it seemed “designed to appeal to
jurors’ prejudices and it goes beyond the evidence.”214 Ultimately,
however, the court found that, though the argument might have
been improper, it was not plain error because the reference to the
questionnaires,
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while perhaps taking the jury momentarily away from the
evidence, was made within the context of attempting to
explain the shifting stories of one of the state's witnesses,
D.B. The comment was not directed at the defendant and
it was not made in an effort to get the jury to align them
selves with the state and against the defendant. . . .
Finally, Wren cites no case, rule, or standard of conduct
that he claims was contravened by the prosecutor's reference to the jurors' answers to the questionnaire.
Accordingly, on this record we hold that the comment,
while improper, does not rise to the level of plain error.215
The Court’s Treatment of ‘Different World” Arguments

Anatomy of the “Different World” Argument
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and
Wren demonstrated a high sensitivity to prosecutors whose arguments address, allude to, or could inspire the jury to consider the
racial or socioeconomic backgrounds of the state’s witnesses.216
However, it is unclear whether the court has accurately interpreted
the prosecutors’ statements.217 To define its concern, the court created an apparent test to determine the propriety of a prosecutor’s
comments. The court distinguishes between improperly asking
jurors to apply racial and socioeconomic considerations and properly preparing jurors for evidence of an unfamiliar world.218 The
court has utilized this test to evaluate a prosecutor’s closing argument in recent cases.219 When creating this test, the court failed to
consider that the prosecutors’ comments in these cases do not seem
to be aimed at asking jurors to apply prejudicial or demeaning
notions or at trying to prepare them for evidence. For this reason,
the test seems to be an imprecise tool for evaluating prosecutors’
closing arguments. The prosecutors in these cases seem to strive,
instead, to encourage jurors to recognize potential biases within
themselves and to avoid applying these biases when judging witnesses’ credibility. Therefore, the court’s “Wren-Robinson” test
likely expresses an inaccurate understanding of the “different
world” argument.
The anatomy of the “different world” arguments found in
Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren is the same, despite the cases’ divergent fact patterns and emphases.220 Whether stated literally or
impliedly by the prosecutor, the basic argument seems to have four
parts:
• The witnesses and the jurors are from different worlds or cultural
environments, based on information acquired during trial and voir
dire.
• It is fair and reasonably predictable that jurors recognize these differences and acknowledge that these differences might cause witnesses to think or act in ways that are different from how the jurors
would want or expect the witnesses to think or act.
• However, these differences also might cause jurors to harbor
unfair negative prejudices about the witnesses, especially because
of the witnesses’ perceived race, socioeconomic condition, or social
environment.
• To do justice and to be fair to the witnesses, the jurors should not
base their credibility determinations on unfair prejudicial generalizations.
This logic is present in each case. In Ray, the prosecutor
sought to acknowledge and explain why witnesses were not more
forthcoming with information about the murder. He did this by contrasting the western suburbs of Minneapolis, which are well known
to have less crime and poverty,221 with North Minneapolis.
The prosecutor then asked the jurors to “not judge the witnesses
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because they are the product of [North Minneapolis . . . but to]
judge their testimony in spite of the fact that they come from [North
Minneapolis].”222 He asked the jurors to give the witnesses the
respect that they deserve by telling jurors to “remove [themselves]
from [their] environment and look at this case and these witnesses
in the context of the environment that they come from.”223 He
asked them to avoid dismissing the witnesses simply because they
are from North Minneapolis and, instead, to treat the witnesses justly.224 The apparently fatal flaw in the prosecutor’s argument is that
he identified the defendant and several witnesses as “three young
black males in the hood in North Minneapolis.”225 The perceived
impact of this description compels an uncomfortable question about
why the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant and witnesses as
black is capable of opening up floodgates of prejudice.226
In Clifton, the prosecutor acknowledged that the witnesses
came from a “different world” but explained that, under the law,
everyone must be treated equally and everyone is entitled to credibility determinations free from implicit bias.227 She emphasized that
these differences should not weigh on credibility determinations
and asked the jury to give the state’s witnesses “the same consideration as any other people.”228 She added, “we are all members of
the same community. We live in the same area, we have the same
laws, we have the same courts, they are a part of us, and we are a
part of them.”229
In Paul, the prosecutor acknowledged that the witnesses
came from a different world than the jurors. He also acknowledged
that the conditions of their environment might influence the way
they think and their interest in, or fear of, cooperating with the
police.230 Yet, the prosecutor then asked the jurors to grant the witnesses some respect, since, regardless of their different lifestyles,
the witnesses came to court and told them what they saw happen.231
In Wren, the prosecutor explained that the witnesses came
from North Minneapolis, which he learned during voir dire is a
place that the jurors feared.232 He then sought to explain that the
witnesses from this part of the city may be reluctant to testify
because they have a very natural fear of being hurt.233 He then
asked the jurors to evaluate the testimony of the witnesses using
common sense and reason.234 Rather than criticizing the residents
of North Minneapolis, the prosecutor appears to have invited the
jurors to respect and appreciate the witnesses and to consider
whether the witnesses’ otherwise questionable actions were reasonable under the circumstances.235
The court’s assessment of “different world” arguments
suggests an obvious aversion to arguments that touch on issues of
race and socioeconomic status.236 The court found either improprieties or “arguable” improprieties in each case, leading the court to
see purposeful race-baiting, intentional denigration of North
Minneapolis residents, and attempts by the prosecutor to align herself with the jurors.237 While a prosecutor who paints demeaning,
racially-based imagery of a community should be criticized, is it
appropriate to suggest that virtually any acknowledgement of or
allusion to cultural differences is tantamount to error? Another reading of the arguments in each case seems to reveal different, more
legitimate intentions.
In each of these cases, it should matter to the court that the
jurors likely had a well-developed set of assumptions about North
Minneapolis before the trial started and were exercising and testing
these assumptions throughout the trial. The jurors’ assumptions
could harm either the state or the defendant, however, no worthy
prosecutor would seek to capitalize on or benefit from the jurors’
prejudices because such conduct would be both wrong and a recipe
for a mistrial.238 Instead, the harm that results from the jurors’ prej-
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udices is likely to come from the jurors directly, who may apply
these biases against the witnesses or the victim with or without any
prompting by the defense attorney. As an officer of the court and
minister of justice, a reasonable prosecutor would harbor concerns
about this implicit bias and would be wise to try to immunize jurors
from their own unconscious prejudice.
Racism is a difficult subject to address, especially in open
court. However, it is reasonable that, when a case may be decided
on witness credibility, the prosecutor will seize the opportunity to
tell the jury which facts are important to consider when making
credibility determinations and which facts are not important.
Factors such as the race, education level, language skills, and
socioeconomic status of the residents of North Minneapolis are not
appropriate measures of witness believability. Discussing the general prejudices faced by a particular segment of society, especially
when the jurors themselves confess to harboring such prejudices
during voir dire, does not indicate an effort to unfairly prejudice the
defendant. More likely, it is an effort to even the playing field, to
ensure that the case will be decided on the evidence, not on unfair
generalizations about the sources of the evidence. Both sides –
prosecution and defense – should have an opportunity to argue to
jurors that a witness’s cultural background should not disqualify
him or her as a credible witness. This opportunity may come only
after the court reexamines the anatomy and purpose of the “different world” argument.
The Court’s Misreading of the Arguments
In Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren, the court is clearly concerned that the prosecutor will prejudice the defendant by fostering
negative racial and socioeconomic stereotypes. However, is the
court exercising this concern appropriately? Is the court’s desire to
prevent racial animus – a laudable goal in any context – preventing
legitimate arguments about the trial evidence and witness credibility?
In a typical trial, jurors are never told to remove their biases. For example, the standard jury instruction regarding witness
credibility does not tell jurors that they are prohibited from taking
into account a witness’s race, (perceived) socioeconomic background, or (imagined) life experience when judging the witness’s
credibility.239 In fact, the instruction that jurors do hear is openended and informs them that they may take into considerations “any
. . .
factors that bear on believability and weight.”240
This is surprising, considering the concern expressed by the bench
regarding eliminating prejudice. What fail-safe exists to ensure that
this open-ended instruction is not a license for jurors to embrace
their prejudices? The prosecutor’s and defendant’s closing arguments could provide that insurance.
The court is cognizant that jurors are capable of applying
racial and socioeconomic stereotypes on their own without any
reminder or urging from the prosecutor.241 Thus, it is inconsistent
for the court to neglect to attempt to root out the maladies it is concerned with in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren. Further, the court
inhibits attorneys from dealing with these problems. It expresses
discomfort with any argument by an attorney that raises concerns
about racial stereotypes. It is as if the court fears that the mere mention of race will tip the scales of justice against the defendant by
suggesting to jurors that they should be biased. In this way the
court responds ineffectively to issues of racial and socioeconomic
diversity within the courtroom, and ignores the current sociological
thinking about the cultural biases that ordinary well-meaning jurors
may harbor about the state’s civilian witnesses.242
The “different world” rhetorical device requires that the
prosecutor acknowledge jurors’ potential for discriminating against
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witnesses based on their differences. There is no way around this.
To talk about something, one typically must bring it out into the
open. By doing this, the prosecutor obviously may have to inject
cultural considerations into the court record, but it is naïve to think
that this would be the first time the jurors had injected such considerations into their own reaction to the case.243 It would be difficult
to argue that these considerations were not present in the jury box
throughout the trial, tacit but pervasive.244 Mainstream sociological research confirms that people are constantly making racial and
socioeconomic judgments – often immediately and unconsciously –
when interacting with others.245 The court’s opinions in Ray,
Clifton, Paul, and Wren suggest that the court might be more comfortable if attorneys remained mute about the realities of human
nature and American culture for the benefit of keeping the record
clean.246 In our current historical reality, it would be unwise to fail
to deal with the jurors’ potential for bias in a sophisticated way.247
The jurors’ world is far larger than the one defined by the four corners of a trial transcript, and attorneys need freedom to deal with the
harms from this world that might invade the trial process.
Surely, the court would not prefer that jurors tacitly apply
racial and socioeconomic stereotypes when evaluating witness testimony to a situation in which these potential stereotypes are
brought out in the open and dismissed as inappropriate. Recent
research reveals that jurors are better able to act without bias if they
are made aware of their potential for race bias.248 Indeed, responding to this and other research, judges in California are now taught
that the best way to avoid unintended biases within themselves is to
make themselves conscious of racial differences between themselves and litigants.249 The California Benchguide on SelfRepresented Litigants advises judges to make themselves conscious
of racial differences because “we are acutely aware of differences
whether or not we consciously acknowledge them, and we are more
likely to make judgments based on implicit biases related to those
differences if we attempt to ignore them.”250 The California court
should be commended for exercising such wise self-awareness.
Yet, despite the increased academic and public awareness
of implicit biases,251 the Minnesota Supreme Court has been slow
to consider the possibility that prosecutors are making “different
world” arguments for appropriate reasons.252 Without a clearer
understanding of the court’s fears and boundaries, the court may
prevent attorneys from vigorously arguing credibility in their closing arguments, and this would be unfair to the parties and to witnesses. By thwarting prosecutorial discretion in such an overt manner, the court not only prevents the state from doing its job, but also
prevents an exploration and inoculation of cultural prejudice in this
crucial civic venue.
Identifying a Genuine Concern about Inspiring Cultural Prejudice
Perhaps the best way to try to understand the court’s perspective is to look at a case in which a prosecutor overstepped her
bounds when referencing race and socioeconomic considerations.
The best candidate is State v. Mayhorn, a 2006 case involving a
murder that took place in Moorhead, Clay County, Minnesota.253
Here, again the court encountered a prosecutor who suggested that
the defendant was from a different world from her and the jurors.
However, in doing so, she utilized strong moral and racial overtones.254 The prosecutor’s remarks in Mayhorn demonstrates that
the genuine concern of the court should be whether, in making
racially-based arguments, the prosecutor is attempting to align herself with the jurors against the defendant.
The facts of Mayhorn are relatively straightforward.255
On August 29, 2003, shortly before 2:20 p.m., Nasean Jordan and
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Janney Garcia were shot in an apartment in Moorhead, Minnesota,
and Jordan died.256 Investigators determined that Troy Mayhorn
masterminded the shooting, though he did not actually shoot
Jordan.257 Police suspected that the motive was drug-related.258
Mayhorn was tried for the murder, and two of his accomplices testified against him.259 Mayhorn testified in his own defense and
claimed that he was not part of any conspiracy and that he was in
the Twin Cities when the murder took place.260 After a three-week
trial, the jury found Mayhorn guilty of aiding and abetting firstdegree premeditated murder.261
On appeal, Mayhorn argued that the prosecutor committed
misconduct when she cross-examined him about why he gave
money for funeral flowers to Jordan's girlfriend, rather than to
Jordan’s sister.262 When she asked about the flowers, he said, “I
mean – you would have to understand the relationships between the
people we’re talking about.” The prosecutor abruptly responded, “I
would have to understand that. This is kind of foreign for all of us,
I believe, because we're not really accustomed to this drug world
and drug dealing.”263 The defendant’s attorney objected to this non
sequitur, and the trial court sustained the objection.264 Mayhorn
argued on appeal that the prosecutor “used the word ‘we’ to align
herself with the jury and to exaggerate the difference between
Mayhorn and herself and the jurors.”265 Mayhorn also argued that,
“[b]y describing Mayhorn’s ‘world’ as something ‘foreign’ that neither she nor the jurors were ‘accustomed to,’ the prosecutor invoked
impermissible racial and socioeconomic considerations.”266
On review, the court noted that prosecutors generally are
permitted to describe a defendant as not being from the same world
as the jurors when “these comments [do] little more than prepare the
jury for evidence of an unfamiliar world involving drugs.”267
However, the court stated, that “it is improper for a prosecutor to
highlight the defendant’s racial or socioeconomic status as a way to
put evidence in context.”268 The court cited Ray for this proposition
but only stated that Ray stood for the notion that “prosecutors
should avoid inviting jurors to apply racial and socio-economic
considerations.”269 The court further analyzed the prosecutor’s
remark by noting, that “there may have been [other] instances in
this trial in which the state attempted to highlight cultural differences between the predominantly white jury and the defendant.”270
The court held that the prosecutor committed misconduct
because the prosecutor “aligned herself with the jury.”271 The error
occurred because the prosecutor “describe[d] herself and the jury as
a group of which the defendant is not a part.”272The court explained
that, “[o]n a more basic level, a prosecutor is not a member of the
jury, so to use ‘we’ and ‘us’ is inappropriate and may be an effort to
appeal to the jury’s passions.”273 The conviction was ultimately
reversed.274
Upon review of the court’s justifiable concern for the
rights of the defendant in Mayhorn, he court’s concerns in Ray,
Clifton, Paul, and Wren become clearer. In just one flippant retort,
the prosecutor in Mayhorn revealed herself as someone willing to
belittle the defendant and distinguish the defendant from the community of jurors. Such statements aim to draw a wedge between the
defendant and the jurors and prevent the defendant from being seen
as someone from the community. Such intentions are unfair,
because they aim to deprive the defendant of a fundamental right;
the right to a jury trial in which the members of the defendant’s own
community are the finders of fact. However, Mayhorm can be distinguished from Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren. The tone and purpose
of the improper comment in Mayhorn varies from those made in the
other four cases, and the attorney’s comment in Mayhorm is
arguably indefensible. Not even an ardent defense-oriented person
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could equate that prosecutor’s words in Mayhorn with the arguments found in Ray, Clifton, Paul and Wren. Unlike the prosecutor
in Mayhorn, none of the prosecutors in Ray, Clifton, Paul, or Wren
attempted to encourage the jury to apply negative cultural stereotypes about the defendant or any of the witnesses, and none were
trying to align themselves with the jury. None seemed eager to
“highlight the defendant’s racial or socioeconomic status as a way
to put evidence in context.”275 At most, the prosecutors’ arguments
could be criticized for referring to matters not in evidence, but this
pales in comparison to the conduct in Mayhorn.
So, is it possible that the court is misreading the arguments
in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren? If so, what may be impeding the
court from appreciating the posture and purpose of these arguments?
Prosecutorial Error and the Court’s Trust
It is revealing that the court in Mayhorn characterized Ray
as standing for the notion that “prosecutors should avoid inviting
jurors to apply racial and socio-economic considerations.” If that
is the rule to draw from Ray, Clifton, Paul, or Wren, then perhaps all
that needs to happen is for the court to be persuaded to believe that
this is truly not the intent or effect of the prosecutors’ arguments.
Consequently, the determination of propriety in these cases
becomes almost an issue more of trust in the intent of the prosecutors than an issue of law. Can the court trust that the prosecutors in
these cases had proper intentions? Can the court trust the defense
attorney would have objected if the comments were truly objectionable? Can the court trust that the trial judge would have stopped the
prosecutor if the comments were improper?
Over the past decade, the court has shown less trust in the
sincerity of prosecutors and their ability to fulfill their roles as “officer[s] of the court” and “minister[s] of justice.”277 In some cases,
the court’s attitude has approached near hostility toward prosecutors. The court in State v. Ramey, for example, modified the important “plain error test” when reviewing instances of prosecutorial
error in order to “put the onus on the prosecutor” and remind prosecutors that “[r]educing the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct
is [their] shared obligation.”278 At this time, Minnesota appears to
be the only jurisdiction in the country to have modified plain error
review specifically to more closely scrutinize prosecutors.279
Ultimately, according to the court, such pressure is intended to curb
what the court saw as prosecutors’ unrelenting engagement in
“clearly prohibited conduct” in the face of decades of judicial effort
to prevent such injustice.280 The court decided it was necessary to
place a greater burden on prosecutors to be aware of and comply
with case law that outlines the rules that guarantee defendants a fair
trial.281
Recently, the court has been primed to find excesses in
prosecutors’ closing arguments. The court in Ramey outlined a list
of eight types of improper conduct that the court has found in prosecutor’s closing arguments since 1984.284 According to the court:
Some examples are: eliciting inadmissible evidence;
alluding in argument to the defendant’s exercise of the
right not to testify, or to the defendant’s failure to call
witnesses; misstating the presumption of innocence, or
the burden of proof; interjecting the prosecutor’s personal
opinion about the veracity of witnesses; inflaming the
passions and prejudices of the jury; disparaging the
defendant’s defense to the charges; and injecting race into
the case when race is not relevant.283
The attitude of the court is revealed by its willingness to address a
single prosecutor’s argument by reciting a laundry list of other
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errors that that prosecutor did not commit. It is within this context
that the court interpreted the prosecutors’ arguments in Ray, Clifton,
Paul, and Wren. In this context, it is understandable that the court
would misinterpret the “different world” argument. The court simply may have assumed that the prosecutors had improper motives.
Though the court did not reverse the convictions in all of
these cases, it spoke negatively of each of the prosecutors’ remarks
in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren. By doing so, the court seems to
have unfairly equated clearly improper Mayhorn-like comments
with the type of oral advocacy seen in these other cases. Even in
cases where the court tried to be sympathetic to prosecutors, the
court’s tone reveals an extreme reluctance to tolerate the prosecutor
talking about differences between the witnesses and jurors. For
example, in Paul, the court noted with sincerity:
Although we find no error here, we take this opportunity
to remind attorneys and district courts of the concerns we
raised in Clifton and Ray, and encourage attorneys to
refrain from using concepts and terms such as different
“worlds” or “these people” to refer to the people intimately involved in the case. Such imagery may imply
that the people involved with the case are somehow collectively distinguishable from the jurors on an inappropriate basis. If an attorney intends to convey that certain
witnesses are credible despite behaving in a way that a
juror might not understand, we respectfully suggest that
there are other, more appropriate ways to address this
concern. Finally, we reaffirm our “strong commitment to
rooting out bias, no matter how subtle,” and invite all
attorneys participating in the criminal justice system to
join this effort.284
The court’s goals are admirable, but, by overlooking that prosecutors’ goals are also admirable, the court expresses unwarranted
doubts about prosecutors’ ability to follow their duties when speaking to jurors.
If a prosecutor inserts racially-based arguments into the
trial, he is most likely not the first person to acknowledge the cultural and racial distinctions between jurors and the witnesses, e.g.
that some of the witnesses are African-American or from North
Minneapolis and that some of the jurors are not.
These differences would become clear during voir dire and during
the trial to just about any juror.285 Clearly, these differences were
obvious to the jurors in Wren, and the prosecutor merely admonished the jury about applying common stereotypes to witnesses
from North Minneapolis. The prosecutor did not attempt to align
himself with the jury, nor did he attempt to create a conflict between
the defendant and the jurors; he appeared to be asking the jurors to
respect the witnesses.
What does it look when a prosecutor tries to align himself
with the jury? It looks a lot different from the arguments made in
Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren. There are a number of cases from
Minnesota that demonstrate improper alignment. In State v. Perry,
the prosecutor told the jury that “none of us are safe” unless the jury
convicted the defendant.286 In State v. Schabert, the prosecutor
expressed a similar sentiment, when he stated that, if the defendant
is released, “just as surely as she has killed her husband in cold
blood, that same thing will happen to her son, or someone else . . .
.” 287 In State v. Jones, the prosecutor attempted to convince jurors
that they entered into a “pact” to convict the defendant.288 In State
v. Haney, the prosecutor tried to convince jurors that they were in a
partnership with the sheriff and county attorney as part of “your law
enforcement machinery.”289 Lastly, in State v. Clark, a case from
rural Martin County, the prosecutor aligned himself with the jury to
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the detriment of “the great criminal lawyer from Minneapolis,”290
who has denigrated and mocked as a poseur and part of the mysterious “society of criminality.” In these cases, the error is clear
because the prosecutor’s attempt to align himself with the jury is
obvious and deliberately prejudicial to the defendant.
The “different world” argument seems to pale in comparison to these clearly improper remarks. The arguments cannot be
analogized to each other, and they clearly do not serve the same purposes. Yet, perhaps, this is what the court is struggling to parse out.
It must recognize that an attorney can discuss the inhabitants of
North Minneapolis in a way that promotes justice and fairness
rather than promotes racial stereotyping.
How The Court Should Analyze “Different World”
Arguements
Despite the court’s concerns about the improper motives of
prosecutors, the case law gives prosecutors great leeway during
closing argument. A prosecutor is not required to make a “colorless
argument” and has the right to present “all legitimate arguments on
the evidence, to analyze and present all proper inferences to be
drawn therefrom.”291 The prosecutor “may state conclusions and
inferences [that] the human mind may reasonably draw from the
facts in evidence,”292 and the prosecutor has the right to argue that
a state’s witness is worthy of credibility based on the prosecutor’s
analysis of the evidence.293 Furthermore, the prosecutor is fully
entitled to anticipate that the defendant’s attorney intends to attack
the credibility of the state’s witnesses in his closing argument.294
Within this context, during closing argument a prosecutor
should be permitted to acknowledge cultural differences that exist
between civilian witnesses and the jurors for the purpose of arguing
that, despite those differences, the witnesses are worthy of credibility. Granted, it is clear that these arguments, in the hands of a tactless and careless prosecutor, could prejudice the defendant.
However, this is equally true of arguments about the burden of
proof, intent, and Spreigl evidence. Of course, no one should be
permitted to be ham-handed when addressing cultural differences
among people, but the possibility of improper misstatements should
not prevent an attorney from making legitimate, proper arguments.
The key for the court is to recognize the propriety of the argument
generally, and then, if an attorney commits any prejudicial error
while making the argument, the court can correct the conduct and
admonish the attorney.
For example, when making a “different world” argument,
there are two obvious errors that prosecutors must avoid: (1) referring to evidence outside the record; and (2) making negative insinuations about the defendant’s character. These two errors are what
the court should be policing.
Referring to Evidence Outside the Record
A clear concern surrounding “different world” arguments
should be whether the prosecutor is referring to evidence that is not
in the record, which is improper. If the prosecutor intends to discuss generally the backgrounds of the witnesses, the prosecutor
must make sure that she lays the foundation for these arguments
during direct examination. The prosecutor would err if she introduced cultural stereotypes that had no connection to the facts of the
case. For example, if she is going to describe a typical day in the
life of the witnesses, she should make sure that the witnesses testify about this, as was done in Clifton.295 Furthermore, if the prosecutor intends to contrast the witnesses with the jurors, the prosecutor should recall only direct statements made during voir dire.296
There would be a great threat of error if the prosecutor began an
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argument by stating, “During jury selection, you seemed . . . .” By
speculating the prosecutor would not only be discussing evidence
not in the record, but would be injecting her own opinion into closing argument. The court should wary of these arguments while still
permitting prosecutors to make legitimate arguments in support of
witness credibility.
Making Negative Insinuations about the Defendant’s Character
A second concern about “different world” arguments
should be whether the prosecutor’s comments have negative implications about the defendant’s character. For example, it would be
error for a prosecutor to state that a witness is courageous for testifying despite the dangers of retaliatory violence if there is no evidentiary basis for suspecting the defendant of such misconduct.
This remark improperly suggests that the defendant is dangerous,
which would prejudice the defendant. If a prosecutor implied that
everyone in North Minneapolis is a gang member or drug user, this
clearly would improperly implicate the defendant in illegal activity.
This type of comment might prompt jurors to make generalizations
about the defendant based on his environment. Although it should
not be improper to, at least, acknowledge that the defendant is from
the same community as the witnesses,297 it clearly would be
improper if the prosecutor used the defendant’s community affiliation to demonize the defendant or align the prosecutor with the
jurors, who are foreign to that community, against the defendant.
This would be as egregious as the prosecutor’s statement in
Mayhorn. The court can police these potential errors but still permit
the prosecutor to make legitimate arguments that serve to thwart
jurors from making negative generalizations about the state’s witnesses.
Conclusion
This article was written at a time when the nation may be
beginning to talk about issues of race and socioeconomic disparity
in an entirely new way, best evinced by then Senator Barack
Obama’s well-publicized March 18, 2008 speech.298 This “new
way,” as characterized by Mr. Obama’s speech299 and by the sociological research into people’s implicit and unintended cultural
biases,300 acknowledges that racial prejudice is still pervasive in
American culture and affirms that ignoring the fact that even wellmeaning individuals are capable of bias only perpetuates society’s
problems. This newfound openness to discussing tacit prejudice
flies in the face of those who believe that “racism” is only something that occurs aloud in public. It addresses the need to combat
covert racism as ardently as overt racism.301
This article argues that the court should consider whether
the court’s opinions in Ray, Clifton, Paul and Wren are a part of an
antiquated way of thinking about how racial and cultural prejudice
plays a role in a criminal trial. The prosecutors in these cases spoke
to the jurors about the tangible cultural differences between the
jurors and the state’s witnesses; they did so by acknowledging that
the jurors and the witnesses came from “different worlds.” In doing
so, the prosecutors seemed intent on bringing out these differences
to force jurors to check their prejudices and to judge the credibility
of the witnesses based on the evidence. The prosecutors’’ arguments, labeled in this article “different world” arguments, are a
rhetorical device that directs jurors to identify and then discard their
fears, prejudices, and possible indifference toward people from
communities like North Minneapolis. In these arguments, the prosecutors most likely did not inject cultural concerns and judgments
into these trials by talking about the “different world” from which
some of the state’s witnesses came because these concerns and
judgments already were present in the jurors’ minds. Instead, these
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prosecutors seemed to argue that, despite the jurors predictable tendencies to make generalizations about the witnesses, the witnesses
were worthy of the jurors’ trust.
The template suggested by these arguments seems proper
and should be permitted by the court. Admittedly, a prosecutor making such an argument faces the danger of misspeaking about the
defendant’s community and prejudicing the defendant, and it still is
wise for prosecutor’s to avoid addressing irrelevant racial considerations. However, if the court defines the proper parameters of the
“different world” argument, an attorney would know what he can
and cannot say. Likewise, a prosecutor, as a minister of justice, can
be trusted to follow the parameters set out by the court. In the
future, the court should review its holdings in Ray, Clifton, Paul and
Wren and give attorneys the freedom to make these arguments when
they are appropriate.
1 Appellant’s Brief at *37, State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007) (No. A06-1283),
2006 WL 4847508 (citing the court transcript). The actual question on the juror questionnaire
was, “[a]re there areas in the City of Minneapolis that you might refuse or be afraid to go into
during certain times of the day?” Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 393 n.12.
2 State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 2005) (quoting the prosecutor’s closing argument).
3 See infra Part III.
4 See, e.g., Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 392-93; State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329 (Minn. 2006); Clifton,
701 N.W.2d at 799; State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 2003).
5 See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (No. A06-1283), 2006 WL 4847508;
Appellant’s Brief, Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329 (Minn. 2006) (No. A05-789); Appellant’s Brief,
Clifton, 719 N.W.2d 793 (No. A03-1964), 2004 WL 3519401; Appellant’s Brief, Ray, 659
N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228), 2002 WL 32704690.
6 See, e.g., Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 747 (“Here, the prosecutor invited the jurors to view the entire
occurrence as ‘involving three young black males in the hood in North Minneapolis,’ a world
wholly outside their own. Such an invitation asks the jury to apply racial and socio-economic
considerations that would deny a defendant a fair trial. Such an invitation must be avoided in
the new trial.”); Clifton, 701 N.W.2d at 799-800 (“The injection of racial and socio-economic
considerations is improper.”). C.f. State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 392-93 (Minn. 2007) (noting that a prosecutor’s remarks are arguably improper if they go beyond the evidence in the
case and appeal to jurors’ prejudices); Paul, 716 N.W.2d at 340-41 (encouraging attorney to
refrain from language that implies that people involved in a case are distinguishable from
jurors on an inappropriate basis).
7 See, e.g., State v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 302-07 (Minn. 2002) (reversing a conviction
after one juror made a racial-biased comment to other jurors when he stated that an area of St.
Paul was a "miracle mile" because if a white person walked down the street and did not get
beaten or robbed it was a miracle); infra notes 245-50.
8 See infra note 10 and Part IV.
9 C.f. Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 392 (juxtaposing Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 747 and State v. Robinson,
604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn. 2000)). In Wren, the court stated that it is error for a prosecutor to
ask jurors to apply racial and socioeconomic considerations, but it is not error for a prosecutor
to seek to prepare jurors for evidence of an unfamiliar world. Id. The court did not address
the propriety of addressing racial and socioeconomic considerations when there is a strong reason to believe that they make affect the juror’s judgment of credibility. See id.
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See infra Part VI.
15 See infra Part VI.
16 See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standards 3.5.1 - 3.5.10 (1993), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc_toc.html [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS];
MINN. R. EVID.; infra notes 18-20.
17 See 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 1.02A
(5th ed. 2006) (instruction at beginning of trial).
This trial is about to begin. During the trial you are going to hear the testimony of
several witnesses. You will have to make judgments about the credibility and
weight of their testimony. Be patient, and listen carefully to the testimony of all
the witnesses. Keep it all in mind until you have heard all the evidence. As you
listen to the witnesses, you should take note of such matters as the witnesses’
interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case; ability and opportunity to
know, remember, and tell the facts; their experience, frankness, and sincerity, or
the lack thereof; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their testimony in light
of all the other evidence; and any other factors that bear on the question of believability and credibility. In the last analysis, you should rely on your own experience, judgment, and common sense. . . . You should keep an open mind about all
the evidence until the end of the trial, until you have heard the final arguments of
the attorneys, and until I have instructed you in the law. Evidence is what the witnesses say and any exhibits submitted to you. What the attorneys say is not evidence. However, you should listen attentively to any statements the attorneys
make. Those statements are made so that you can better understand the testimony.
Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 17.
18 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 3.11 (5th
ed. 2006) (instructions at end of trial).
Attorneys are officers of the court. It is their duty to make objections they think
proper and to argue their client’s cause. However, the arguments or other remarks
of an attorney are not evidence. If the attorneys or I have made or should make
any statement as to what the evidence is, which differs from your recollection of
the evidence, you should disregard the statement and rely solely on your own

71

memory. If an attorney’s argument contains any statement of the law that differs
from the law I give you, disregard the statement.
Id. (emphasis added).
19 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 3.12 (5th
ed. 2006) (instructing jurors that they are the sole judges of whether witnesses are to be
believed and informing them of what factors they may take into consideration when judging
credibility). Jurors are told that they may take into consideration a witness’s credibility based
on several factors, including (1) interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case; (2) relationship to the parties; (3) ability and opportunity to know, remember, and relate the facts; (4)
manner; (5) age and experience; (6) frankness and sincerity or lack thereof; (7) reasonableness
of their testimony in light of all the other evidence in the case; (8) any impeachment of the witness’s testimony; and (9) and any other factors that bear on believability and weight. Id.
20 See supra notes 18-20.
21 See State v. Patterson, 577 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. 1998) (establishing that prosecutors
cannot personally endorse the credibility of the state’s witnesses, express personal opinions as
to the credibility of witnesses, or even impliedly guarantee the truthfulness of witnesses); State
v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 1995); State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn.
1984) (“An advocate…may not throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal opinion.”); State v. Schwartz, 122 N.W.2d 769, 773-74 (Minn. 1963) (reversing a lower
court decision where prosecutor asserted that he was “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” by
the evidence) (emphasis added); State v. Cole, 59 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1953); State v.
Gulbrandsen, 57 N.W.2d 419, 622 (Minn. 1953). See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 17,
Standard 3-5.8(b) (1993) (“The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or
opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.”);
Phil Carruthers et al., Prosecutorial Misconduct (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.mcaamn.org/docs/2007/ProsecError-Phil-9-14-06.pdf; William B. Johnson, Annotation, Propriety
and Prejudicial Effect of Comments by Counsel Vouching for Credibility of Witnesses, 45
A.L.R.4th 602 (1986); James H. Kaster, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: Part
I, MINN. TRIAL LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 12, 15; JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 9.19 (3d ed. 2003); Henry Blaine Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey
of Limitations on the Prosecutor’s Closing Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22,
33-35 (1973).
22 See supra notes 18-29.
23 See MINN. R. EVID. 607 (providing that any party may attempt to diminish or impeach
any witness’s credibility). The specific forms of impeachment available to a party are governed by other rules of evidence and case law. For the purposes of impeachment, a party may
show that: (1) The witness is biased or corrupt. MINN. R. EVID. 616; State v. Johnson, 699
N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49-56 (1984);
Goss v. Goss, 113 N.W. 690, 692 (Minn. 1907); (2) The witness has a sensory or mental defect
that prevents an accurate account of the facts. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Minn.
1977); (3) The witness made a prior inconsistent statement. MINN. R. EVID. 613; (4) The
witness’s testimony is contradicted by other evidence. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d
214, 225 (Minn. 2000); Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn.
1997); (5) The witness has been dishonest or is believed to be a dishonest person. MINN. R.
EVID. 608; State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 2007); (6) The witness has prior convictions. MINN. R. EVID. 609. The admissibility of impeachment evidence is subject to the
court’s authority to exclude evidence under MINN. R. EVID. 401 and MINN. R. EVID. 403
and to limit cross-examination to matters covered on direct-examination under MINN. R.
EVID. 611(b).
24 A prosecutor has an opportunity to face the jurors during closing argument and “may argue
that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” See State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603,
614 (Minn. 2003). Moreover, a prosecutor has a right to argue that the state’s witnesses were
worthy of credibility. State v. Googins, 255 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Minn. 1977); see also State v.
Yang, 627 N.W.2d 666, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). In addition, in Googins, the court held that
a prosecutor has “a right to analyze the evidence and vigorously argue that the state’s witnesses
were worthy of credibility whereas [the] defendant and his witnesses were not.” Googins, 255
N.W.2d at 806 (emphasis added); see also State v. Booker, 348 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn. 1984)
(stating “the prosecutor had a right to urge the jury to consider defendant’s interest in the outcome in assessing his credibility.”) (citing City of St. Paul v. Willier, 231 N.W.2d 488 (Minn.
1975)). The court has held that, “[i]n closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to the
jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence [and] to analyze and explain the evidence.” State
v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 1996) (citing State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 419
(Minn. 1980)); see also State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn. 2000) (holding that a
prosecutor may offer an interpretation of the evidence but may not offer a personal opinion as
to the defendant’s guilt). The court also has held that “prosecutors are given considerable latitude during final argument and that they are not required to make a colorless argument.” State
v. Ives, 568 N.W.2d 710, 714 n.1 (Minn. 1997) (citing Smith, 541 N.W.2d at 589); State v.
Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. 1996).
25 See State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. 1993) (“[P]rosecutors are, of course, free
to make arguments that reasonably anticipate arguments defense counsel will make in closing
argument.”).
26 See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Minn. 2006).
We have identified numerous kinds of trial conduct that are improper for prosecutors. Some examples are: eliciting inadmissible evidence; alluding in argument to
the defendant’s exercise of the right not to testify, or to the defendant’s failure to
call witnesses; misstating the presumption of innocence, or the burden of proof;
interjecting the prosecutor’s personal opinion about the veracity of witnesses;
inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury; disparaging the defendant’s
defense to the charges; and injecting race into the case when race is not relevant.
Id. at 300 (citations omitted); see also supra note 22.
27 See supra note 25.
28 See, e.g., Minneapolis Police Department, Rejection Criteria, available at
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/recruiting/rejection.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2006)
[hereinafter Rejection Criteria] (allowing for rejection of applicant if applicant fails criminal
background check, psychological evaluation, drug tests, medical/eye exam, employment/job
performance background check, or the like). Further, large police departments such as the
Minneapolis Police Department will have a separate investigative unit dedicated to homicide
investigations, enabling the department to ensure that only experienced, competent investigators will work on homicide cases. Minneapolis Police Department, Investigations, available at
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/about/investigations.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2009)
[hereinafter Investigations].
29 See supra note 29.
30 See State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 2003) (involving multiple eyewitnesses who
changed their stories and showed reluctance to testify over the course of the police investiga-

Spring 2009

tion).
31 As the prosecutor in Clifton acknowledged:
You know, it would be nice when you're preparing a case for trial, if you were
able to call up a movie studio and call up central casting and say, “Say, I need a
couple of witnesses for my trial and could there be a nun and could there be a fire
fighter and maybe a minister? Could you throw in some people that would be just
so believable by who they are?” But that's not reality. The reality is you have to go
to the people who are there at the time, who saw what they saw. Those are the
people who are your witnesses, the people who were at this incident.
State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 2005). As for the motivation to testify, cooperate, and tell the truth, these traits vary, and often may be quite low, among civilian witnesses.
See, e.g., State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329 (Minn. 2006) (taking over a year and plea negotiations
with eyewitnesses before police could convince eyewitnesses to the homicide –which occurred
in broad daylight – to cooperate).
32 See infra Part IV (discussing Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, Paul, 716
N.W.2d 329 and State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007)).
33 See, e.g., Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746. In Ray, one of the state’s eyewitnesses had a felony
conviction on his criminal record, and the prosecutor argued to the jury:
Really, other than that, nothing Howard Nelson said was really particularly damaging to this defendant. He doesn't identify him. He doesn't positively say this
person right here was the person who was with Colie Gates, so what relevance is
it that it was brought out that he has a criminal background? The defense brings
that out because they want you to dismiss him. The more you despise someone,
the easier it is to dismiss them. But would that be fair and just in this case? It's
up you to decide this, folks, but you need to ask yourselves that what relevance is
there to the testimony that Howard Nelson presented that he has a criminal background, and what a surprise when you think about this environment, when you
think about where this crime took place. What a surprise that somebody has got
some criminal conviction.
Respondent’s Brief at *17-18, Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228).
34 See infra Part IV (discussing Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, Paul, 716
N.W.2d 329 and Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378).
35 See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief at *29-30, Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (No. A06-1283). In his
rebuttal, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate a witness who was impeached for contradicting himself on the stand by explaining:
He told you that he mumbles his words sometimes . . . . Clearly he probably is
not the most articulate person in the world, but that just may be a product of the
environment that he lives in. . . . But that doesn’t mean that he can’t make a good
faith misstatement and tell you the truth about the other more significant items
that he testified to.
Id.
36 See 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 3.12
(5th ed. 2006) (instructing jurors that they are the sole judges of whether witnesses are to be
believed and informing them about what factors they may take into consideration when judging
credibility). Jurors are told that they may take into consideration a witness’s credibility based
on several factors, including (1) interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case; (2) relationship to the parties; (3) ability and opportunity to know, remember, and relate the facts; (4)
manner; (5) age and experience; (6) frankness and sincerity or lack thereof; (7) reasonableness
of their testimony in light of all the other evidence in the case; (8) any impeachment of the witness’s testimony; and (9) and any other factors that bear on believability and weight. Id.
37 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
38 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 2005).
40 See infra Part IV.
41 See North Minneapolis: Tour North Minneapolis Neighborhoods,
http://www.northminneapolis.com/tour/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Tour
North Minneapolis]. They are the neighborhoods of Cleveland, Victory, Folwell, McKinley,
Jordan, Hawthorne, Webber-Camden, Willard-Hay, Near North, Harrison, Sumner-Glenwood,
Lind-Bohanon, and Single Creek. Id.
42 Minneapolis Home Page, Standard Maps, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/about/maps
(follow “Minneapolis Neighborhood Boundaries” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Standard Maps].They are the communities of Near North and Camden. Id.
43 See Minneapolis Police Department: Police Precincts & Neighborhoods,
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/about/precincts.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Precincts]; MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15,
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/crime-statistics/docs/annualreport2002.pdf [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT] (“The Fourth Precinct serves North Minneapolis— affectionately called
the ‘Northside.’”)
44 See Tour North Minneapolis, supra note 42; Standard Maps, supra note 43.
45 See Precincts, supra note 44; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44; Minneapolis Police
Department: Fourth Precinct, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/about/4th-precinct.asp
(last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
46 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 45 (quoting a 2000 estimate).
47 Id. (quoting 2000 Census figures).
48 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NARRATIVE PROFILE: MINNEAPOLIS CITY, MINNESOTA, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/NPTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=16000US2743000&qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_NP01&-ds_name=&-redoLog=false (last visited Jan. 17,
2009) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU] (citing figures from its American Community Survey,
2006).
In 2006, Minneapolis city had a total population of 369,000 - 183,000 (50 percent)
females and 186,000 (50 percent) males. The median age was 33.6 years. Twentytwo percent of the population was under 18 years and 8 percent was 65 years and
older.
...
For people reporting one race alone, 71 percent was White; 19 percent was Black
or African American; 1 percent was American Indian and Alaska Native; 5 percent
was Asian; less than 0.5 percent was Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander,
and 4 percent was Some other race. Three percent reported two or more races.
Nine percent of the people in Minneapolis city was Hispanic. Sixty-three percent
of the people in Minneapolis city was White non-Hispanic. People of Hispanic
origin may be of any race.
Id.
49 Steve Brandt, Serious Crime in &orth Minneapolis Falls 15%, STAR TRIB., Nov. 13, 2007,
available at http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/11823016.html.
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50 INSTITUTE ON RACE AND POVERTY, TWIN CITIES DEMOGRAPHICS,
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/irppres%2009-12-04.ppt (last visited Jan. 17,
2009) [hereinafter TWIN CITIES DEMOGRAPHICS]; Northwest Area Foundation Indicator
Website, North Minneapolis,
http://www.indicators.nwaf.org/DrawRegion.aspx?RegionID=Comm2701 (last visited Jan. 17,
2009) [hereinafter Foundation Indicator]; Minneapolis Public Library, A History of
Minneapolis, Residents of the City, 20th Century Growth and Diversity: Maps, 1990-2000,
http://www.mpls.lib.mn.us/history/re4.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Minneapolis
Public Library] (citing date from 1990 U.S. Census and 2000 U.S. Census); METROPOLITAN
COUNCIL, TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA: BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, 2000 (2004),
http://www.metrocouncil.org/Census/Maps/black_00.pdf (citing 2000 U.S. Census data) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN COUNCIL].
51 Mark Stenglein, Commissioner Stenglein on the African-American Men Project,
http://www.co.hennepin.mn.us/portal/site/HCInternet/menuitem.3f94db53874f9b6f68ce1e10b1
466498/?vgnextoid=751a9bb82e9fc010VgnVCM1000000f094689RCRD&vgnextfmt=default
(last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
52 Id.
53 North Minneapolis, Resources: Per Capita Income,
http://www.northminneapolis.com/resources/index.html (follow "Per Capita Income Chart"
hyperlink) [hereinafter Per Capita Income].
54 Institute on Race and Poverty, Twin Cities School Demographics,
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/Twin_Cities_Schools_Race_and_Poverty_9-2205.ppt (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter School Demographics].
55 Crossroads Research Center, Hennepin County Census Data: Poverty and Income,
Minneapolis Neighborhoods, available at http://www.crcworks.org/hennepin/Mplspoverty.htm
(follow "Percent of persons below poverty level by age group, Minneapolis neighborhoods,
1999" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Hennepin County Census Data] (citing 2000 U.S. Census data).
56 Brandt, supra note 50.
57 DAVID HAYHOE ET AL., 2006 HOMICIDE SUMMARY 6,
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/about/docs/MPD2006HomicideProject.pdf (last visited
Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter HOMICIDE SUMMARY]. According to the Minneapolis Police
Department, there are five modes of death: homicide, suicide, natural, accidental, or undetermined. Id. at 1.
58 Id. at 20; ROBERT K. OLSON & RICHARD STANEK, HOMICIDE SUMMARY: 1998,
1999, 2000, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/crime-statistics/docs/2000HomicideCharts.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
59 HOMICIDE SUMMARY, supra note 58. Also of note, Minneapolis police recovered 995
guns in 2006, 524 of which were recovered in North Minneapolis. David Chanen,
Minneapolis’ Violent Crime Rose Sharply in ’06, STAR TRIB., Dec. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.rlnn.com/ArtDec06/MinneapolisViolenceCrimeRose06.htm (dedicating half of the
article about the increase in violent crime to the gang and youth crime problems perceived to
exist in North Minneapolis) [hereinafter Chanen, Minneapolis' Violent Crime].
60 David Chanen, Crackdown Turns Around Crime in Minneapolis, STAR TRIB., Jan. 21,
2008, available at http://www.startribune.com/12916761.html [hereinafter Chanen,
Crackdown].
61 HOMICIDE SUMMARY, supra note 58. Out of the sixty homicides in 2006 in
Minneapolis overall, thirty-nine of them (65%) involved an African-American victim and, out
of the forty-three homicides with known assailants, thirty of them (70%) involved AfricanAmerican assailants. Id. Forty-seven of the sixty homicides were from gunshots. Id. These
statistics are very similar to statistics from other years available. See OLSON & STANEK,
supra note 59 (summarizing homicide rates in 1998, 1999, 2000).
62 See infra note 64.
63 Brandt Williams, Homicide Problem Awaits Minneapolis’ New Chief, MINN. PUB.
RADIO, July 9, 2007, available at
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/01/09/dolan [hereinafter Williams,
Homicide Problems].
The city's northside neighborhoods saw more than its fair share of violent crime in
2006. And much of the police department's efforts to combat crime have been
focused there.
...
Another north side resident, Doris Cunningham, says while she's not going to let
crime drive her out of town after spending 40 years here, she understands why
some people leave.
"Lots, lots of people getting robbed. Lots of shooting. Young people are scared to
go out of their houses because of this. Older people are scared to go out of their
houses. Robberies are just crazy."
Like Rose Smith, Cunningham says she has not been a victim of violent crime.
However, Cunningham says her garage was broken into recently. But she knows
hothers haven't been so lucky.
Id.; Brandt Williams, State Troopers to Assist Minneapolis in Fighting Crime, MINN. PUBLIC
RADIO, June 29, 2006, available at
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/06/29/troopersmpls [hereinafter Williams,
State Troopers]
For the second time in nearly three years, the Minnesota State Patrol has been
called in to help fight crime in Minneapolis. Gov. Pawlenty announced that six
troopers will begin work this weekend in the 4th Precinct on the city's north side.
While violent crime is up citywide, the north side has seen some of the sharpest
increases and is the site of the majority of the city's homicides.
....
"We realize that Minneapolis and some other areas of the state have additional
burdens to bear in terms of combating crime and public safety because of the challenges that certain neighborhoods face, for a variety of reasons," Pawlenty said.
"We want to make sure that the resources that we deploy in those areas is as helpful and impactful as possible."
Those neighborhoods are located in north Minneapolis.
Id.; see also Chanen, Crackdown, supra note 61 (dedicating half of the article about the
increase in violent crime to the gang and youth crime problems perceived to exist in North
Minneapolis); Anne O’Connor & Tatsha Robertson, Chain of Violence, STAR TRIB., Dec. 15,
1996, at 1A (recounting the history of recent gang murders in Minneapolis and their interrelations).
64 Brandt, supra note 50. The article begins:
Think of the North Side of Minneapolis and what comes to mind? Crime and
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foreclosures? Or parks, clubs and gathering spots?
A new marketing strategy for north Minneapolis is designed to get you to think
more of the latter.
Id. Chanen, Crackdown, supra note 61.
Mike Martin, the [Fourth P]recinct's inspector, said "we're at a turning point on the
North Side, and we have to take advantage of it." He senses a change in the community's tolerance of crime.
"When people learned a store on W. Broadway was selling T-shirts with gang
symbols, they told the owners that didn't represent the values in the neighborhood," he said. "And they pulled them off the shelves."
Id. (emphasis added); see also Ahnalese Rushman, U Looks to Help on &orth Side, Sept. 14,
2007, MINN. DAILY, available at http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2007/09/14/72163376.
65 Kate Zernicke, Violent Crime in Cities Shows Sharp Surge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at
A14.
“There are pockets of crime in this country that are astounding,” said Chuck
Wexler, the executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum, which is
releasing the report on Friday. “It’s gone under the radar screen, but it’s not if
you’re living on the north side of Minneapolis or the south side of Los Angeles or
in Dorchester, Mass.”
Id.
66 Hennepin County Attorney Website, http://www.hennepinattorney.org (Jan. 17, 2009).
67 Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District Website, http://www.mncourts.gov/district/4 (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Fourth District Website].
68 Hennepin County Attorney Website, supra note 67.
69 Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District: Jury Service,
http://www.mncourts.gov/district/4/?page=355 (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Fourth
District Website, Jury Service] (explaining how jurors are selected for jury duty).
70 Association of Minnesota Counties, County Demographics,
http://www.mncounties.org/About_Counties/county_demographics.htm [hereinafter County
Demographics].
71 Hennepin County Census 2000 Fact Sheet 2, Hennepin County Race and Ethnicity,
http://www.co.hennepin.mn.us/images/HCInternet/Static%20Files/100043837Census2000FactS
heet2.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 2] (citing 2000 U.S. Census data).
72 Hennepin County Census 2000 Fact Sheet 8, Hennepin County, Household, Family, and
Per Capita Income,
http://www.co.hennepin.mn.us/images/HCInternet/Static%20Files/100045632Census2000FactS
heet8.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 8] (citing 2000 U.S. Census data).
73 Crossroads Research Center, Hennepin County Census Data: Poverty and Income,
Minneapolis Neighborhoods, http://www.crcworks.org/hennepin/tables/Mplspovertyage.htm
(citing 2000 U.S. Census data) (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Crossroads Research
Center, Poverty and Income].
74 Minnesota Department of Administration Datanet, 2000 Census SF1 and SF3: Report and
Mapping Menu, http://www.lmic.state.mn.us/datanetweb/php/census2000/c2000.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Report and Mapping Menu].
75 Crossroads Research Center, Percentage of Population by Races, Tallied, Minneapolis
Neighborhoods, 2000, http://www.crcworks.org/hennepin/tables/MplsRace_in_combo.htm (last
visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Crossroads Research Center, Population by Races] (citing
2000 U.S. Census data).
76 Crossroads Research Center, Hennepin County Census Date: Racial Composition,
http://www.crcworks.org/hennepin/censusrace.htm#Pie Charts (last visited Jan. 17, 2009)
[hereinafter Crossroads Research Center, Racial Composition] (citing 2000 U.S. Census data).
77 Compare. MapStats: Crimes Reported in Hennepin County, MN, available at
http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/crime/county/27053.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter MapStats] (reporting 60 murders in Hennepin County in 2000), with HOMICIDE SUMMARY, supra note 58 (reporting 50 homicides in Minneapolis in 2000).
78 See supra notes 42 and 78 and accompanying text.
79 State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 739-4; State v. Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
80 All of the shell casings and bullets were .45 caliber. Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 740; Gates, 615
N.W.2d at 335.
81 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 740 (“Ray's then-girlfriend Latasha Johnson had given Ray the phone a
few months earlier . . . . Ray later told Johnson he had lost the phone.”); see also Gates, 615
N.W.2d at 335.
82 Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
83 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 739; Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
84 Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
85 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 739.
86 Id.
87 Id.; Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
88 Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
89 Id.
90 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 739-40. Gates went by two different nicknames: “CK” and “CJ.” See
id. at n.2.
91 Id. at 740.
92 Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335; Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 740.
93 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 74; Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
94 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 740.
95 Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 335.
96 Id. at 336.
97 Id.
98 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 740.
99 Id. at 339.
100 Id.
101 Id.; Respondent’s Brief at *15, Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228). She also was
charged with perjury for her misrepresentation. Id.
102 Respondent’s Brief at *15 n.1, Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228).
There is no question that Depring Jackson “feared reprisals.” As Sergeant Violette
testified, he spoke with Depring Jackson after the video tape showed that she was,
in fact, present at the scene of the crime. Sergeant Violette noted that as he started
to talk to her, he could see that she was frightened and “her eyes were welling up
with tears.” She said that she did not want to talk to Sergeant Violette and then
said “Sergeant Violette, you don't understand, you're white. You don't live in this
neighborhood. You don't have to see these people after you've talked to them. And
I do.” Sergeant Violette also testified “and at that point, it appeared that she was
literally beginning to cry.”
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Id. (citations to trial transcript omitted).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 740.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 741. Gates was also tried and convicted for the murder of Teasley. Gates, 615
N.W.2d at 335.
112 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746; Respondent’s Brief at *15, Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00228).
113 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746; Respondent’s Brief, Ray, at *15, Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C000-228).
114 Respondent’s Brief, at *15, Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228).
115 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746.
116 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746. Golden Valley, Edina, and Minnetonka are more affluent and
less diverse suburbs of Minneapolis.
117 Respondent’s Brief, at *15-16, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228) (emphasis added).
118 Id. at *17; see also Ray 659 N.W.2d at 746.
119 Respondent’s Brief, Ray, at *17-18, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228); see also Ray, 659
N.W.2d at 746.
120 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 744.
121 Id. at 744.
122 Id. at 746.
123 Id. at 744.
124 Id. at 746 (citing State v. Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122, 127 (Minn. 1984)).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 747 (citing State v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Minn. 2002)) (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted).
127 See id. at 746-47.
128 State v. Clifton, 710 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Minn. 2005).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 797.
135 Id. at 796.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Minn. 2005).
141 Id. at 799-800.
142 Respondent’s Brief at *18-19, State v. Clifton, 719 N.W.2d 793 (2005) (No. A03-1964),
2005 WL 2213961. (quoting the trial transcript).
143 Clifton, 701 N.W.2d at 799-800.
144 Respondent’s Brief at *20, Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793 (No. A03-1964) (quoting the trial
transcript). This paragraph was not included in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s summary of
the prosecutor’s argument. See Clifton, 701 N.W.2d at 799-800.
145 Respondent’s Brief at *20, Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793 (No. A03-1964) (quoting the trial
transcript). This paragraph was not included in the supreme court’s summary of the prosecutor’s argument. See Clifton, 701 N.W.2d at 799-800.
146 Respondent’s Brief at *19-20, Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793 (No. A03-1964) (quoting the trial
transcript)
147 Clifton, 701 N.W.2d at 799-800; Respondent’s Brief at *20, Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793 (No.
A03-1964) (quoting the trial transcript).
148 State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 2005).
149 Appellant’s Brief at *16, State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007) (No. A06-1283),
2006 WL 4847508.
150 Id .at *16, 20.
152 Clifton, 701 N.W.2d at 800 (citations omitted).
153 Id. (citing State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 757 and State v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 304
(Minn. 2002)).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. (quoting State v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. 2002)).
157 Id.
158 See id., 701 N.W.2d at 799-800
159 State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. 2006).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. Paul was driving his friend’s black Chevrolet Tahoe and had been with his girlfriend at
the Hennepin County Government Center that morning and drove to the north Minneapolis
café for breakfast. Id.
163 Id. Herron, in fact, had a child with-and was engaged to-Paul's sister. Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 332.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 333.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. At that time, Paul was arrested on an unrelated warrant for terroristic threats. Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 334.
183 Id. at 339-40.
184 Id. at 340.
185 Id. (footnote omitted).
186 Id. at 340. The court noted that the statements in Paul were more brief than those in Ray
or Clifton and that “the language and imagery used to explain the lack of cooperation of witnesses in this case was considerably less inflammatory.” Id.
187 Id. at 341. (quoting State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475 (2005)).
188 State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 37, 383 (Minn. 2007).
189 Id. When Wren walked up to Washington, Washington stood up and asked, “What's up?”
or “What are you reaching for?” Wren then pulled out the gun and shot. Id. at 383-84.
190 Id. at 383.
191 Id. at 384.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 383-84.
194 Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 383 n.3.
195 Id. at 384.
196 Id. at 383. Teda Ayler and A.J. testified that, on the day before the shooting, Wren stated
that he was going to do something or kill Washington because he shot his brother. Id.
Washington testified that, on the day of the shootings, he told three friends that he was having
problems with Wren’s brother. Id.
197 Id. at 384 n.2.
198 Id. at 383 n.3.
199 Id. at 384.
200 Id. at 385. Wren told the FBI that he learned he had a warrant out for his arrest on an
unrelated matter, so he took a bus to Chicago under a different name. Id. Wren later told
Minneapolis that part of the reason he left Minneapolis was because he knew the police were
looking for him regarding the regarding the shooting. Id.
201 Id.
202 Appellant’s Brief at *28, State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007) (No. A06-1283),
2006 WL 4847508 (emphasis added).
203 Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 385.
204 Id. at 385-86.
205 Id. at 386.
206 Id. at 385. “The jury found Wren guilty of the premeditated murders of Haynes and
Robinson in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1) and 609.11 (2006), and guilty of the
attempted murder of Washington in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1), 609.11, and
609.17 (2006).” Id.
207 Appellant’s Brief at *27, State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007) (No. A06-1283)
(citing the court transcript). The actual question on the juror questionnaire was, “Are there
areas in the City of Minneapolis that you might refuse or be afraid to go into during certain
times of the day?” Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 393 n.12.
208 Appellant’s Brief at *28, Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (No. A06-1283) (citing the court transcript).
209 Id. (citing the court transcript).
210 State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 392 (Minn. 2007).
211 Id. (juxtaposing State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Minn.2003) and State v. Robinson,
604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn.2000)).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 393. D.B. was a witness who testified that he saw Wren enter and leave the steak
house. Id. at 384.
216 See supra Part IV.
217 Even in Paul and Wren, where the court seemed to show increased receptivity to the “different world” arguments, the court is unwilling to appreciate why the prosecutor felt it was
necessary to raise the arguments, to introduce the known biases against North Minneapolis, and
clear the air about the jurors’ potential for prejudice. See supra Part IV.
218 See, e.g., State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 392 (Minn. 2007) (juxtaposing State v. Ray,
659 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Minn.2003) and State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn.2000)).
219 See id.
220 See supra Part IV (describing the prosecutor’s arguments in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and
Wren).
221 See supra Part III.
222 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
223 Id.
224 Respondent’s Brief at *15-16, State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 2003) (No. C0-00228), 2002 WL 32704692
225 Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746.
226 The court suggests in Paul and Clifton that a large reason why it refrained from reversing
these cases is that the prosecutor did not explicitly mention race. Though any experienced trial
lawyer is aware that issues of race are discussed at length and in straightforward terms by both
parties during voir dire, it appears that the court has strongly resisted any reference to the
defendant’s race during closing argument unless race is particularly relevant to the facts of the
case. Granted, racial prejudice is a powerful force still today in American society; however, is
it the type of force that is summoned by and only by the explicit mentioning of race? Is it the
type of force that is kept in check by and only by a moratorium on references to the race of the
defendant or witnesses during closing argument?
227 State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. 2005).
228 Respondent’s Brief at *19-20, State v. Clifton, 719 N.W.2d 793, (2005) (No. A03-1964),
2005 WL 2213961 (quoting trial transcript).
229 Id.
230 State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329, 339-40 (Minn. 2006).
231 Id.
232 Appellant’s Brief at *28, State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 2003) (No. C0-00-228),
2002 WL 32704690 (citing the court transcript).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Wren may be an exception to this because the court apparently caught on to the prosecutor’s argument. Yet, the court still introduced and discussed the Ray-Robinson test without
showing any greater appreciation for the line of cases that includes Ray, Clifton, and Paul.
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237 See supra Part IV.
238 But see State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 693-95 (Minn. 2006) (permitting the prosecutor
to talk about the racial background of the murder victim and witnesses when the issue of race
was deeply relevant to the motivations of the defendant and the witnesses).
239 See 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 3.12
(5th ed. 2006)
240 Id. Specifically, the instruction tells jurors that, when determining whether a witness is
credible, they may consider (1) interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case; (2) relationship to the parties; (3) ability and opportunity to know, remember, and relate the facts; (4)
manner; (5) age and experience; (6) frankness and sincerity or lack thereof; (7) reasonableness
of their testimony in light of all the other evidence in the case; (8) any impeachment of the witness’s testimony; and (9) any other factors that bear on believability and weight. Id.
241 See, e.g., Varner, 643 N.W.2d at 302 (reversing a conviction after one juror made a racially biased comment to other jurors, stating that an area of St. Paul was a "miracle mile"
because, if a white person walked down the street and did not get beaten or robbed, it was a
miracle).
242 See infra notes 244-50.
243 Id.
244 See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007); Robert G. Schwenn, Why Do Landlords Still
Discriminate (and What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 500-507
(2007) (reviewing the academic literature related to the psychological studies of implicit bias
and their legal implications).
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